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PANEL III: United States v. Martignon—
Case in Controversy
Hugh C. Hansen ∗
William Patry †
David Patton ‡
Robert W. Clarida §
Marjorie Heins ||
Jane Ginsburg #
MR. DANITZ: Good afternoon. I am Brian Danitz. I am the
symposium editor of Volume 16 of Intellectual Property, Media,
& Entertainment Law Journal at Fordham.
Moderator:
Panelists:

On behalf of the Journal, welcome. Thank you for coming
today. You are all invited back to next year’s symposium.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank a few people:
Dean Treanor; Dean Diller; my faculty advisers: Professor Hugh
Hansen, Professor Katyal, Professor Patterson; the folks in the
Office for Public Programming and CLE, especially Darin Neely
and Helen Herman.
I would especially like to thank our esteemed panelists for their
scholarship and advocacy in the area of intellectual property law,
and for sharing the fruits of their intellectual labor with us today.
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Université de Paris II, 1985 (Fulbright grantee); Doctor of Law, Université de Paris II,
1995.
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Now it is my distinct honor to introduce Professor Hugh
Hansen, who will be moderating the copyright discussion, which
promises to be a really exciting one. Professor Hansen teaches
courses in copyright law, trademark law, European Community
intellectual property law, advanced copyright law, and U.S.
constitutional law at Fordham. He is the founder and director of
the Annual International Intellectual Property Law and Policy
Conference at Fordham School of Law, now in its fourteenth year.
He has had speaking tours in Japan and Australia and averages
about 10 presentations a year here and abroad. He has edited
seven volumes on international intellectual property law, and one
on U.S. IP law and policy. The 2006 edition of his book New York
Intellectual Property Handbook will be published shortly by
Matthew Bender/Lexis Nexis.
Professor Hansen.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Thank you very much, Brian.
Congratulations to you for putting together this symposium. I
know that you have put in a lot of hard work over many months.
We have had, I understand, two terrific panels already, and this
looks like it is going to be another one.
The biographies are in the materials. To save time for
discussion at Fordham we normally just give the name of the
speaker and his or her affiliation and refer people to the
biographies.
We have five speakers. Brian has devised a format where Bill
Patry, of Thelen, Reid & Priest, will give an address and the other
speakers will then give their comments or critiques. After that, we
will have a general discussion with the audience and panelists.
The one exception to this format is that, if anyone wishes to
have a point clarified, that question may be asked right after that
speaker’s presentation. Anything further should be left for the
final discussion.
This symposium will be published in a future edition of the
Fordham IPLJ. The very able staff of the Journal will add
footnotes to the oral presentations given here today.
Without further ado, Bill Patry.
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MR. PATRY: Thank you, Hugh.
I am here because I was the one who drafted the bootleg
statute 1 that is the topic discussion today. I wrote the statute when
I was a congressional staffer in the House of Representatives, in
the Intellectual Property Subcommittee. In that role, I wrote a fair
number of statutes. I was used to being criticized by groups who
didn’t get everything they wanted. I will say, I never expected any
statute I wrote to be held unconstitutional, and certainly not by
second-year law students. 2
I appreciate, of course, the venue in which I am speaking. I
was a full-time faculty member at Cardozo for five years. I am
sure it was a tremendous thrill, but it is one, from a societal
standpoint, that I would hope is not repeated.
Being on the defensive, I decided that I would wear my
camouflage. I thought I was going to be outnumbered, and indeed
I may be. I hope to take away some of the flak by one particular
mea culpa, but it may not be enough for some of you. So I decided
I would go anonymous, or at least be able to deflect some of it.
What I would like to do is give you some background about
how it is that this particular statute was passed, what we were
thinking of. Some may think we weren’t thinking at all, and I want
to give you at least assurance that people in Washington, when I
was there, before the “Great Cultural Revolution” in 1994, did
spend time earnestly attempting to think things through. It doesn’t
mean we always came up with the best policy. I would say that
this particular statute has a substantial policy flaw in it. But it was
a statute that underwent a fair amount of high-level consideration.
In 1994, Congress was given the task by the administration of
implementing legislation that arose out of the Uruguay Round
Agreements. 3 This particular round of WTO agreements was
noteworthy because it incorporated for the first time protections for
1

17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000) (17 U.S.C. § 1101 is a civil
statute; 18 U.S.C. § 2319A is its criminal counterpart).
2
See United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 416 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
3
See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS].
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intellectual property and services, so that if one were found to
violate the obligations that the treaty imposed, then a recalcitrant
country could be taken to a WTO panel and have cross-sector
retaliation imposed. 4 That was a serious issue. Indeed, the United
States, I believe, was the first to be taken to the dock on our
Section 110(5) expansion that came about as a result of term
extension. 5 So it was a serious issue, and you wanted to make sure
you got it right.
It was a big deal to have intellectual property in a trade
agreement where there are some teeth to it. Prior to then, countries
that didn’t have penalties—like people who speed and don’t get
caught (I would include myself in that)—would do things without
fear of retribution. If there is no penalty, if there is no stick, and
you try to get away with as much as you can. I will come back to
that in a minute.
GATT was a different sort of beast. It was an obligation that
the executive branch engaged in. It wasn’t a congressional
initiative. That means that Congress’ job was to implement
legislation, not to formulate policy.
That being said, it was not the case—as Judge Pooler said at
the oral argument in the Second Circuit in the Martignon case,
“Why didn’t Congress just do what it was told?” 6 I found that to
be incredibly chutzpahdik and, frankly, rather ignorant of how the
system works. Told by whom? Congress may do things wrong,
but it is not like some treaty tells Congress, “You have to do this.”
That is just not the way it works.
What Congress did was to attempt to fulfill the treaty
obligations in a good-faith manner and to figure out how it wanted
to effectuate the protection that was required. After all, the treaty
merely said, “You have to do X and Y.” It didn’t tell any country
how it had to do X and Y. There was a fair amount of discretion in
how X and Y were done. 7

4

See id. at 1215.
See 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (2000); 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000); see also Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 191 (2003).
6
United States v. Martignon, No. 04-5649-cr (2d Cir. argued July 12, 2005).
7
See TRIPS, supra note 3, at 1198.
5
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There were some procedural issues also. First of all, it was
fast-track legislation, meaning that once the bill was introduced,
that was it; there was no amending. 8 It was a straight up or down
vote on a 3,000-page bill. 9 There was no way that bill was not
going to pass. There was no way anybody was going to vote
against the bill based upon on some intellectual property provision.
As important as we may think intellectual property is, I can tell
you, in a 3,000-page trade bill, it doesn’t mean diddly-squat. It just
was not a big deal.
It was a big deal to us, though, because that was our job. So
we sat down with the administration and other people and figured
out what should go in. It was particularly important to do it,
because, as I mentioned, once it goes in, that’s it; it’s law. 10 So
you had to get it right before the bill went in—not like ordinary
bills, where you can hold hearings, you can change it, you can
listen to people, you can play with it; the Senate is going to do
something. That wasn’t the case here. You either got it right or
you didn’t. Many people would say we didn’t get it right, and to
some extent, I would agree. But we did think about it.
Another thing about being a trade bill and a fast-track bill is
that, as an obligation for a treaty, we didn’t engage in the ordinary
incentives-balancing that some people think Congress does—on
the one hand, this, and on the one hand, that; does it promote the
progress of science by this or that. Forget it. That is just not the
task. The task is: you have this treaty obligation. You have to do
it. What is the best way to do it? There may be, and should be,
policy issues in there, but the ordinary process of balancing
incentives was taken away by the obligation to give the protection.
So any debate about whether it was good policy to give protection
for this was not on our table at all. It was something we had to do,
and we did it.
The specific obligation was to give to performers the right
against an unauthorized fixation of their work and subsequent
8

See 19 U.S.C. § 2903 (2000); Michel v. Anderson, 14 F.3d 623, 632 (D.C. Cir.
1994).
9
See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994)
[hereinafter URAA].
10
See 19 U.S.C. § 2903 (2000).
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distributions of an unauthorized fixation. 11 The term that was set
out in the treaty itself was “at least fifty years.” 12 It didn’t say
“only fifty years.” If it had said you couldn’t give more than fifty
years that is what we would have done. We would have done, as
Judge Pooler so much wanted us to do, what we were told. But we
weren’t told “just fifty years.” We were told “at least fifty
years.” 13 If a statute says, “You shall protect blue cars,” okay, we
will protect blue cars. If we want to protect green cars, we will
protect those, too. We are not violating a treaty obligation by
doing more than the treaty requires. So if we gave more than fifty
years, we weren’t violating the treaty in the least.
An initial question that we faced, which one should face in any
exercise of this nature, is: do you have to pass any implementing
legislation? It is very common for countries to want to sign
treaties that don’t obligate them to do anything, but require the
other side to do lots of things. That is a great treaty for one side:
“hey, you guys have an obligation you didn’t have before; we
don’t have any, because our law already does it.” The United
States is quite fond of treaty obligations like that. 14
So our first task was to honestly look through and see whether
we could do one of those rope-a-dopes. Could we say, “Guess
what? We woke up in the morning and we’ve already got the
protection that this treaty obligates us to have”? There was some
evidence of that. There were state laws that gave protection of this
nature. 15
One problem with that was that it wasn’t uniform. Another
problem was that, in 1988, when the United States joined the
Berne Convention—we joined on March 1, 1989, but the
legislation was passed in 1988 16 —there was a requirement in

11

See 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000).
TRIPS, supra note 3, at 1202.
13
Id.
14
See, e.g., Extradition Treaty with Great Britain and Northern Ireland, U.S.-U.K.,
Mar. 31, 2003, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-23 (2003).
15
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 540.11(2)(a)(3) (2002).
16
See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat.
2853 [hereinafter BCIA].
12
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Article 6bis to provide moral rights. 17 That was quite a big issue.
There were many hearings held on that, many debates. 18 Then one
morning the United States woke up and said, “Wow, we have had
moral rights all along. We actually have them in state laws 19 and
maybe in Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 20 so we don’t have to
do anything. 21 We now can join the Berne Convention, 22 and this
enormous issue that was so problematic is just gone, because the
states do it.” As I said before, the treaty didn’t obligate you to do
it in a particular way; it merely obligated you to have protection. 23
That was felt by some to be intellectually dishonest, if not
factually inaccurate. 24 There was some criticism in Europe after
Berne—sort of a “morning after” thing—“Gee, it’s great that
you’re in, but you’re not what I thought you were.” So we thought
that was probably a weak basis upon which to fulfill this
obligation. We wanted to do better, frankly, than we had done in
1988.
Another reason is that the U.S. Customs Service came to us
and said, “We don’t think it’s a very strong basis for us to stop
imports based solely on state law. We are a federal agency. There
may be state anti-bootlegging laws, but we’re uncertain whether
we have the authority to stop the importation into the United States
of a bootleg that merely violates state law. It would be helpful to
us if you had a federal statute.” We thought that was a decent
enough concern.

17

See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Paris Act,
art. 6bis, July 24, 1971, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-27, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne
Convention].
18
See H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, pt. 3, at 7 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6915, 6917.
19
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West 2006); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03
(McKinney 2006).
20
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000).
21
See H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, pt. 3, at 7–8 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N
6915, 6917-18; S. REP. NO. 100-352, pt. 3, at 9–10 (1988), as reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N 3706, 3714–15.
22
See Berne Convention, supra note 17, art. 6bis.
23
See TRIPS, supra note 3, at 1198.
24
See, e.g., Robert J. Sherman, Note, The Visual Rights Act of 1990: American Artists
Burned Again, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 373, 405 (1995).
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A final concern was that if our trade negotiators, USTR, 25
wanted to go around to other countries that were a source of
bootlegs, it would helpful for them to have on the books a strong
federal statute, so they could avoid, in some ways, the Berne
problem, that they could point to it and say, “Look, we have this
federal statute here, and we would like you to enact something like
that.”
All three of those things made sense, to have a federal statute
where there wasn’t one before. There was no question that there
was no existing federal statute that covered it. So we decided that
we would have a federal statute.
Now, where would that statute be placed? What would it be
based on? That was the next issue that we had to decide. This,
surprisingly to me, has turned out to be a key component, at least
in the court opinions. I have to say, I am disappointed by the
unfamiliarity with how laws are actually made that is reflected in
some of those opinions. I am not talking about policy. That is a
different issue. Frankly, I have difficulties defending the statute on
some of the policy grounds. And I am very happy to talk about
law rather than policy, for that reason.
But let’s talk about placement. Contrary to what most people
think, where a law is placed—a federal law—has little, if any,
consequence at all. A law can just be. Once both bodies pass it
and the President signs it, that is really it. That is what the law is.
So if Congress decided that they wanted to ban the implanting of
global positioning chips on children under the age of 4—I don’t
know if it is a good idea or not; I have 4-year-old twins, so I am
thinking of it—if they wanted to do that, they could put that in
Title 17, Title 15, any title they want, or not in a title at all. It is no
more or less a law whether it is in a title or not.
I used to think—and Jane can correct me if this is true—that, in
fact, the Lanham Act is not codified. I think West put it in Title
15, 26 but I don’t think Congress did. I may be wrong on that, but I
think that is right.

25
26

United States Trade Representative.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141(n) (2000).
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United States Code, U.S.C.—or U.S.C.A. for West—is not a
codification of all laws. The United States Code represents some
laws that happen to be put into a certain bin, but the Code is not all
laws. There are lots of laws that aren’t in USC. Indeed, it is very
rare for effective dates in statutes, including copyright statutes, to
be codified. Effective dates are pretty important parts of a statute.
They are usually not codified. The copyright acts that I have been
involved with don’t have effective dates that are codified.
So where an act is placed or whether it is codified really
doesn’t have any consequence, legally. Sometimes it is merely
administrative. I will tell you a little bit about that right now.
When we decided to have a federal statute, where would we
put it? We could have put it nowhere. That probably would have
been a good idea. Originally, we wanted to put it in what is called
by West (but not by Congress) Title 15, the trademark part. 27
We wanted to put it in Title 15. We drafted it in Title 15
originally, because we viewed it as an exercise of commerceclause power, 28 and it made sense to put it in the Trademark Act. 29
We took it out of Title 15 only at the very, very end of the
process. We took it out for a personal reason that had nothing to
do with the legal reasons. The reason was this. In the
subcommittee, when I worked there, I handled the copyright
issues. There was another lawyer who handled trademark and
patents. She also did prisons, which is convenient for the criminal
part of these statutes. That lawyer had gone to the trademark
groups, when they were trying to figure out what was going to be
in the bill, and she said, “There are very few amendments to the
Trademark Act in this. Here are the ones that there are. What do
you think of them?” Fair enough to do, since once the bill is
introduced, you can’t change it. So if you are going to talk to
people and get their input, you have to do it early. And she did.
She said, “There are only one, two and three that are in there.”
They said, “We don’t care about those. That’s fine.” So they went
back to bed.
27
28
29

15 U.S.C. § 1501 (2000) (effective July 5, 1947).
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141(n).
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As it turned out, we didn’t view the bootleg provision as a
copyright provision, nor did she. Since she had gone and told
people this, we—“we” being chief counsel and I—went ahead and
put it in Title 15. We thought, “That makes sense. Why not? It is
not copyright; it is Commerce Clause. We’ll put it in there.”
So a draft of the bill was sent around. The trademark people
saw this and accused her of breaking her word. They said, “Look,
you’re amending the Trademark Act. You’re putting this bootleg
provision in there. You told us it would only be one, two and
three.” She went ballistic at us. On a personal basis, it was a lot
easier for us to say to her, “Okay, okay, okay, we made a mistake.
We didn’t mean to do it.”
So we took it out at the very end and put it in Title 17. 30 We
didn’t change the bill at all. That is why I say the placement of the
bill was really quite irrelevant. The fact that it is in Title 17 has
merely to do with the fact that it was much easier for us to placate
Jeralyn by putting it in there, rather than having to listen to her and
argue about it. She was pretty tough. She had prisons, after all;
we didn’t—“all right, fine; you want it in Title 17? We’ll put it in
Title 17.” And we did.
Now, getting on to the constitutional part of it, we did actually
think quite seriously about this. My view—and I understand Prof.
Ginsburg may have a slightly different one—is that for a work to
be considered a writing within the meaning of the Constitution, it
has to be fixed. 31 It doesn’t extend to unfixed works. 32 That turns
out to be a rather critical thing. I thought that the Eleventh Circuit
agreed, 33 and I thought, in his own hapless manner, Judge Baer
thought that, too, although it is sort of hard to figure out what he
did think, since I find his opinions inconsistent. 34
Nevertheless, we started from that assumption, that “writings”
is limited to fixed works. 35 Since, by definition, we were only

30
31
32
33
34
35

See 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000).
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
See id.
See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999).
See United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 421 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
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protecting unfixed performances, my belief was, and remains, that
we were not legislating under the Copyright Clause at all.
We talked to the administration. We talked to the Copyright
Office. We talked to a number of constitutional copyright
scholars. It wasn’t something where we sat back and said, “What
do you think?” “No, I don’t think so. I think ‘writings’ is only
fixed work. Let’s do it.” It wasn’t that way. It was deliberate.
We did talk to people. We did think about the issue. We did some
reading about it. At that point, I had been practicing copyright law
for thirteen years full-time. It wasn’t something we did off-thecuff. It was something that we thought was substantively correct.
If we had thought it was permissible to legislate under the
Copyright Act, 36 we would have. I was a copyright lawyer. It was
much more natural for me to do that. I had never done anything
outside of copyright, so it was my first instinct to do it.
Having decided that the Copyright Clause was limited to fixed
works and that the performances in question were unfixed, 37 we
knew that we were not legislating under the Copyright Act—knew
in the sense that that was our intention. I understand that there
might be some difference of opinion about that. But when the
Eleventh Circuit said that Congress thought they were legislating
under the Copyright Clause, 38 I don’t get that. We clearly were
not. You can say we were wrong because you disagree with how
we interpreted the Constitution, but to say that we thought we were
legislating under the Copyright Clause is nonsensical.
I will give you a textual reason for that. I don’t expect you to
say, “Oh, well, he says that, and he was there. What good does
that do me?” I am not even talking about legislative history, which
you may or may not look at, and even if you did look at, you
wouldn’t find very much on this.

36

General Revision of Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 101, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332).
37
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
38
See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 1999).
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But the statute itself, in § 1101(a), says that a violator of the
right shall be subject to the remedies provided in §§ 502–505 to the
same extent as an infringer of copyright. 39
Now, what does that mean to ordinary people who have a
moderate ability to read a statute in good faith? It means that you
are not a copyright infringer. If you were a copyright infringer, we
wouldn’t have said anything. We certainly wouldn’t have said “to
the same extent as if you were a copyright infringer.” That says
that we thought that this was not a copyright provision, and the fact
that it was in Title 17, 40 for the reasons I just gave you, is silly. It
just doesn’t make sense. This is sort of plain stuff. The idea that it
could be “copyright-like” I don’t quite get either. You are
pregnant or you are not pregnant. Either it is a Copyright Clause
or it is not a Copyright Clause. It can’t be “copyright-like.”
We will get into the dormant Copyright Clause issue, and I will
certainly leave that to Professor Ginsburg, who is a much greater
authority on it than I am. I would say, though, in terms of policy—
here is my mea culpa on this—because we didn’t think we were
operating under the Copyright Clause, we believed that we were
free to do what we wanted, including the term of protection. Being
free was sort of exhilarating—“wow, it’s nice to be out from under
the Constitution for once. How long do we have to chafe under
that terrible document. Now we’re free to do whatever we please.”
We thought, how long is this protection going to be? Anything
seemed arbitrary. We thought, why be arbitrary? Just do it. How
many times do you have the opportunity to just do it, and have no
limits at all, have an act without any limitations? That is what we
did.
In hindsight, I think that was a huge mistake. I do think that
we had the power to do it. I do think it was a terrible policy
judgment. There is no reason to go beyond the fifty years that
were set forth in the treaty—not because the treaty told us to do it.
It didn’t tell us to do it. On that, obviously, I have a very
combative view towards what Judge Pooler said at argument in the

39
40

See 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2000).
17 U.S.C. (2000).
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Second Circuit. 41 But fifty years was really quite adequate. It
really did not need to be more than that. After the term extension
in 1998, 42 which was four years later, I like to think that I have
learned something, and one of the things that I think I have learned
is that a long term of protection has very bad societal impacts. 43
For this one, the public didn’t gain anything by it being so long,
and, actually, I think, was rather harmed by it. For that, I certainly
apologize and confess error.
On the Commerce Clause issue—this is where it really gets
down to it—a few things I will dispatch quickly, because I know
other people want to talk and certainly have great things to say.
Judge Baer argued that the mere placement of it in Title 17
showed that we were concerned with the interests of artists, not
commerce. 44 I didn’t think there was a huge difference between
artists and commerce, and certainly when you are talking about
tours, they are engaged in interstate commerce. That is just a
bizarre little argument, for me.
Another one that some people take seriously–I hope no one
here takes that one seriously—is that live performances can be
original and that, because they are original within the colloquial
creative sense § 1100 is a copyright provision. 45 I think that is tied
to the issue of fixation, although if you have the view that the
Writings Clause in the Constitution 46 encompasses things that
could be fixed but aren’t, then I would say that we are wrong on
the constitutional part of that. I don’t think we are, but I accept
that some people believe that the word “writings” doesn’t mean

41

See United States v. Martignon, No. 04-5649-cr (2d Cir. argued July 12, 2005)
(during oral arguments Judge Pooler inquired as to why Congress did not simply do what
it was told to do).
42
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat.
2827 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 301–304 (2000) and other scattered
sections of 17 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Bono Act].
43
See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 266 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(noting that the Bono Act will pose serious harm to society).
44
See United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 421–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
45
See, e.g., Brian Danitz, Comment, Martignon and Kiss Catalog: Can Live
Performances Be Protected?, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143, 1186
(2005).
46
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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just fixed, and it means things that could be fixed. 47 Since a live
performance could be original, if you are of the other view, you
could tie those two things together, and the statute would indeed
have the infirmities some people think it does.
So fixation is really, I think, the key issue. For me, there is a
distinction between the subject matter that is being protected—the
live performance—and the violation of it. The violation of it, of
course, in Mr. Martignon’s case, was not the fixation, but the
distribution. 48 He only engaged in distribution. I can see how it is
easy to look at it and say, “Wait a minute. What he or anybody
else was doing was distributing a fixed copy of a live performance,
which, once fixed, people would believe is original work of
authorship.” I think that is the argument.
My response to that is, okay, that is true, but the subject matter
that we were concerned with was the live, unfixed performance;
the fixation of it is the copy, it is not the work, in copyright
parlance—which I am reluctant to fall into the trap of—because
people will say, “See? You’re talking about it like it’s a copyright
statute. You really think it is.” But it is a distinction between the
material object and the particular immaterial subject matter that we
are dealing with there.
I also think that there is an authorization issue. I think, to be
fixed, it has to be fixed with the authority, understanding that other
countries don’t do that, that Berne doesn’t require it. 49 If you
believe that fixations can be unauthorized, I think you would have
to preempt state laws, because states can protect unfixed oral
works right now. 50
Enough background. I will turn it over to others, who will
have, probably, more interesting things to say. But I wanted to at
least provide the background for why Congress seemingly did
something that seems too “fercockta.”
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Thank you.

47
48
49
50

See Danitz, supra note 45, at 1190–91.
See Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 417.
See Berne Convention, supra note 17.
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 980(a)(1) (West 1982).
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I think we should hear from the counsel for the defendant in
this case, who probably has a different view—I am just guessing—
David Patton, out of the Federal Defender Office in the Southern
District of New York.
[See article below in lieu of presentation transcript.] 51
PROF. HANSEN: Thank you very much.
I think now we will have Bob Clarida, from Cowan, Liebowitz,
and Latman.
MR. CLARIDA: Thank you.
I have been involved with this case—not, certainly, as long as
David, and not involved with the statute anywhere near as long as
Bill has—but I was very interested in this the first time I read the
decision and was contacted shortly thereafter by the RIAA, the
Recording Industry Association [of America], which was
interested in putting in an amicus brief in support of the
government, 52 in support of the constitutionality of this statute,
when the case went up on appeal to the Second Circuit. 53 I drafted
a brief for the RIAA in connection with this case. 54
I understand that a representative of the RIAA was going to be
on the panel today and couldn’t make it. I am not his stand-in. I
am not here today to speak for the RIAA or for my firm. I am just
giving you my own observations, which are generally in agreement
with the positions set forth in the RIAA brief, which is in your
material.
I will give you a quick synopsis of the argument that we made,
and then I will go into some of the points in a little more detail.
As to the writings question, we did not get into that. I don’t
think that is a question that is up on appeal. The court’s finding as
to writings—that these live performances are not writings 55 —was
51

David Patton, The Correct-Like Decision in United States v. Martignon, 16
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1287 (2006).
52
Brief of Amici Curiae UMG Recordings, Inc., et al. in Support of Reversal, United
States v. Martignon, No. 04-5649-cr (2d Cir. Mar. 15, 2005) [hereinafter RIAA Brief].
53
Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, appeal docketed, No. 04-5649-cr (2d Cir. Oct. 26,
2004).
54
RIAA Brief, supra note 52.
55
Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 423.
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something that I thought was so devastating to the conclusion that
the court ultimately tried to reach that certainly it was not
something that we were going to take issue with. If you take the
position that live musical performances are not writings, then I
don’t see what possible relevance the Copyright Clause has on any
of this, because, as I will get into briefly, the powers of Congress
under Article I are cumulative. 56 Certainly, the fact that you can
operate under one clause and protect a particular subject matter has
nothing to do with the other kinds of protection you might be able
to provide to other subject matter under other clauses of the
Constitution.
So by saying that the works at issue, the
performances at issue, are not writings, I think, should have been
the end of the day, and the court should have said, “They are not
writings. The Copyright Clause doesn’t govern.”
There is also the issue of whether the performers at issue are
authors in a constitutional sense. Certainly, some may be authors.
Bob Dylan gets up and performs his own music. He is both an
author of the underlying music and, if the performance is fixed
with his authorization, he is an author of the sound recording as
well. But it is not the case, and certainly not the case with
otherwise unfixed performances, that the performers can be
deemed authors in the constitutional sense or statutory sense. 57
Also, I think the purposes of the bootleg statute are quite
different. It is not to give authors an incentive to create writings.
If we start from the premise that the performances at issue are not
writings, then we are not giving anyone an incentive to create those
writings. As Bill described the genesis of the statute, it clearly
arose out of a trade bill.58 International trade concerns were first
and foremost in Congress’ mind and the Clinton Administration’s
mind in putting this together. 59 It was not something that was seen
as necessary to promote the progress of science and the useful arts,
as the Constitution says in Article I, § 8. 60
56

See RIAA Brief, supra note 52, at 12.
RIAA Brief, supra note 52, at 14–16.
58
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
59
See Brian Danitz, Martignon and Kiss Catalog: Can Live Performances Be
Protected?, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 1143, 1153–58 (2005).
60
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
57
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Also the statute was filling a very important gap that had been
pointed out in federal law. Bootlegging convictions had previously
been sought and obtained under the National Stolen Property Act,
the NSPA, before about 1985. 61 There was a case in 1985 called
Dowling v. U.S., 62 in which that was held impermissible. The
National Stolen Property Act could not be used to stop the sale of
bootleg recordings. 63
So there had been a federal statute that prohibited this. 64 That
statute was no longer applicable under that precedent. 65 This
federal protection, 66 basically, was filling the gap that had existed
since that time. There had been state law protection in various
states, 67 but there wasn’t a federal law. Clearly, this is a federal
problem. It is an interstate and international problem. One of the
things about the statute that doesn’t get much attention is the fact
that it pertains to trafficking in fixations of performances, even if
the fixation occurred outside the United States. 68 There is clearly
an international dimension, as well as an interstate dimension.
So for all those reasons, we thought that there was no
application of the Copyright Clause, nor did we see that there was
a conflict with the Copyright Clause and the Commerce Clause
here. Basically, the Railway Labor Executives v. Gibbons 69
analysis was not very persuasive, I think, because the statute at
issue in Gibbons was a bankruptcy statute. 70 There is no question
about it. The statute at issue here 71 —certainly, at least arguably—
is not a copyright statute. It is copyright-like. That is as close as
the court will come to saying it is a copyright statute. It is
copyright-like.

61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

18 U.S.C. §§ 2314–2315 (2000).
473 U.S. 207 (1985).
Id. at 229.
18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2000).
Dowling, 473 U.S. 207 (1985).
17 U.S.C. § 1101.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 540.11(2)(a)(3) (2002).
17 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3).
455 U.S. 457 (1982).
45 U.S.C.A. § 1005 (2000).
18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000).
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The word “purview” comes up three times in this opinion. You
can read a lot of opinions and not see the word “purview.” It
comes up three times here. The court, in one instance, says the
statute is within the purview of the Copyright Clause, 72 and twice
it says the statute is not within the purview of the Copyright
Clause. 73 So that says to me that the relationship between the
statute and the Copyright Clause was extremely unclear to the
court. Yet it was that sort of perceived kinship between the statute
and the Copyright Clause that I think was the basis for the court’s
reasoning. It saw this sort of emanation from the Copyright
Clause—“well, this has something generally to do with the arts;
therefore, it has to come within the ambit of the Copyright Clause,
and it has to play by the rules and the limitations of the Copyright
Clause.”
To give a little bit more detail on a couple of those points, I
think it is quite clear under the statute as written, and as Bill has
described it, that they were not trying to protect authors here; they
were trying to protect performers. The language in the statute
itself says, “Whoever, without the consent of the performer or
performers involved.” 74 This is not an author-protection statute; it
is a performer-protection statute. The creations that they are
making are not works of authorship under the statute, under 102(a),
that lists various types of copyrighted works. 75
Now, Moghadam 76 points out, and I think correctly, that the
drafting of § 102(a) does not include live musical performances. 77
It is not one of the types of copyrighted works listed in § 102(a). 78
Moghadam says that Congress could have done that differently,
that they could have included live musical performances under
§ 102(a). 79 Perhaps they could have. We have the writings
question, whether you consider it a writing or not. But they could

72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

See United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
See id. at 424.
18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000).
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999).
See id. at 1274.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1273.
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have, perhaps, included live musical performances, and they didn’t
do that.
The performer in a case like this may, in fact, be creating a
writing, or may not. But what they are certainly doing with respect
to the underlying work is exercising a right in the work. They are
not creating a new work by performing it. Performance is one of
the exclusive rights granted in § 106 of the Copyright Act. 80 When
a person performs a work, he is not thereby creating a new work
any more than a museum is creating a new work when it hangs a
painting on the wall. It is giving a public display of that work.
That is exercising a right in the work. It is not creating a new
work.
If you then step back from that painting and you take a
photograph of that painting hanging on that wall, you have created
a new work which incorporates the painting, and you have a new
work of authorship. But merely by hanging the painting on the
wall, you don’t create a new work. You are not an author by virtue
of doing that.
The argument that we made was that a performer, in
performing a work, is not an author by virtue of doing so. 81
There is also a policy question about the underlying policy of
this statute vis-à-vis the Copyright Act. There is not a quid pro
quo here. There was a lot of discussion at the time of the Eldred 82
case that went up to the Supreme Court about the importance of a
quid pro quo. 83 There is certainly case-law support for this, the
idea that in order to get copyright protection, an author has to
dedicate a work to the public and, in exchange, receive a period of
exclusive rights in that work. 84 So there is this exchange that takes
place between the author and the public. You are donating
something to the public.
What is going on here is that someone is fixing and trafficking
in a performance that was never intended to be made public. This
80
81
82
83
84

17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1274.
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
See id. at 216.
See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
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is not something that the artist is dedicating to the public. The
public is deprived of nothing here, except the right to eavesdrop on
a performance that they didn’t buy a ticket for. That is the only
thing the public is being deprived of. It is simply not a matter—in
Bonito Boats, 85 for example, there is this language: Does it
constrict the spectrum of useful public knowledge, or does it
restrict the public’s ability to exploit a work in general
circulation? 86 There is no work in general circulation here. There
is no useful public knowledge that is being withheld. What is
being withheld is what happens within an auditorium for people
who pay to be in that auditorium.
It is possible for a performer in a situation like this, by not
authorizing a fixation of his or her performance, to opt out of
copyright altogether, to say, “What I’m doing is not about
copyright. What I’m doing is giving a performance, and if you
want to come to my performance, buy a ticket.” That is what the
performer is doing. The performer is opting out of this federal
statutory scheme that exists for copyright, in the same way that an
inventor can, perhaps, opt out of the patent system by simply
keeping the information as a trade secret. 87 You don’t have to
enter into this exchange. You can keep it secret. You can keep it
within your four walls and charge people to come in and see it. Or
you can make a recording of it and sell it, and then you have the
bargain with the public, the quid pro quo.
But the bootleg statute doesn’t require that. 88 Also, the bootleg
statute doesn’t require originality in the performance. It requires
that the performance be live. 89 It doesn’t require that it be original.
If you are talking about the differences between what a performer
does and what an author does, originality is the sine qua non of
authorship in the copyright sense—in the constitutional sense, as
Feist 90 tells us—but it has nothing to do with a performance. If I
get up and do a performance that is very much like Marcel
85
86
87
88
89
90

489 U.S. 141 (1989).
Id. at 159.
HARRY D. NIMS, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS 406 (1929).
18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000).
18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000).
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).

PANEL_3_TRANSCRIPT_091706_CLEAN

2006]

ANTI-BOOTLEGGING LAW CASES

9/17/2006 6:06:10 PM

1243

Marceau, it is not my performance. It is not an original
performance. It may be substantially similar to Marcel Marceau’s.
Now, maybe it wouldn’t be covered here because it is not a live
musical performance, but if he were singing, I guess it would be.
(He was a mime, but if he were to have done a live musical
performance.)
If I got up and did my best Bob Dylan imitation, there would
be nothing original about that. Yet it could still be protected under
this statute.
As far as the placement in the statute and things like that,
which both Bill and David alluded to, I will just go through a few
points that the court made. The court said there is no reference to
the Commerce Clause anywhere in the statute or the legislative
history. 91 But, of course, there is no recital of any particular
constitutional source needed.
The no-recital rule is wellestablished. 92 Congress can even recite the wrong clause, and it is
still okay. 93
The placement in Title 17, 94 I think, should be a non-issue.
The criminal statute that we are talking about, of course, is not
even in Title 17. It is 18 U.S.C. § 2319(a). But even if it were—
say, § 1101, which is the civil analogue, is placed in the copyright
statute—that has nothing to do with it. It can still be supported by
the Commerce Clause. The Authors League case, I think, is
probably the best illustration of that; Authors League v. Oman, a
case in which the Manufacturing Clause, former § 601 of the
Copyright Act, which is now abrogated, was held permissible
under the Commerce Clause. 95
I will just read you quickly a quote from Authors League. 96
This was a section within Title 17, 17 U.S.C. § 601, prohibiting the
91

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
“The constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the
power which it undertakes to exercise.” Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v.
Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 244, n.18 (1983) (quoting Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333
U.S. 138, 144 (1948)).
93
Cf. Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948).
94
17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000).
95
790 F.2d 220, 224 (2d Cir. 1986).
96
Id.
92
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importation of works manufactured abroad. “The Copyright
Clause is not the only constitutional source of congressional power
that could justify § 601. In our view, denial of copyright
protection to certain foreign manufactured works is clearly
justified as an exercise of the legislature’s power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations.” 97
So it is not the case that if something is in Title 17, it is thereby
a copyright provision.
Also the court said this criminal statute imports definitions
from the Copyright Act, definitions of what is fixed and so on and
so forth, distribution. 98 But the Copyright Act itself incorporates
definitions from other statutes, for example, the FCC Act, Title 47,
which is under the Commerce Clause. 99 If you look in the
Copyright Act, there are definitions about what a terrestrial
broadcaster is and all sorts of things having to do with broadcast
that are imported wholesale from the FCC provisions, which are
based in the Commerce Clause. 100
So that doesn’t mean those provisions are not copyright
provisions, simply because they incorporate definitions from
elsewhere.
Finally, just to touch briefly on the treaty power, which the
court did not deal with at all—and it was really surprising to me,
because I thought that the exhortation to a court was always to try,
if possible, to find some constitutional basis for a statute, and not
throw out a statute gratuitously. I think there is an independent
treaty power basis here, because the treaty power of the Necessary
and Proper Clause provides Congress with the power to do things
pursuant to ratification of an international agreement that it has no
Article I power whatsoever to do. 101
The case, specifically, that we cited in our brief is Missouri v.
Holland, 102 which Justice Holmes decided in 1920. It involved an
97
98
99
100
101
102

Id. at 224.
Id.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
See Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (1999).
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
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act to prohibit the hunting of migratory birds. 103 The statute had
been struck down as unconstitutional twice. 104 Then, finally, the
executive branch executed a treaty with the United Kingdom,
which included Canada, saying that we have to do this as part of a
treaty obligation, and the statute was upheld. 105 It had previously
been struck down as unconstitutional because the court said there
was no Article I basis for this statute. 106 When the statute was
passed to implement this treaty, it withstood constitutional
scrutiny. The court said, “It is obvious that there may be matters
of the sharpest exigency for the national well-being that an act of
Congress could not deal with, but that a treaty, followed by such an
act, could. It is not lightly to be assumed that in matters requiring
national action, a power which must belong to and somewhere
reside in every civilized government is not to be found.” 107
There is a limitation on that. Certainly, we couldn’t have a
treaty with China where we said, for anybody who criticizes China,
we are going to not enforce their copyright, because they are
criticizing China. We couldn’t do that. There is a case called Reid
v. Covert 108 in 1957, which says that where there is a violation of
the affirmative provisions of the Bill of Rights, even the treaty
power won’t reach. 109 But that is only where Congress is
depriving people of their constitutional rights. It is clear, in Reid v.
Covert, you can’t deprive people of their constitutional rights. 110
But here, there is no constitutional right to make and distribute
bootlegs of live musical performances. So by taking that away
from people, I don’t think we rise to the level of violating the
limits of the treaty power, as articulated in Reid v. Covert. 111
So under the district court decision here, I think it is
categorically impossible for the United States to meet its

103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111

See id.
Id. at 431.
See id.
See id.
250 U.S. at 433.
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)
See id.
See id.
See id.
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obligations under TRIPS. 112 Even fixing the duration would not be
an issue, would not actually solve the problem, because, as Judge
Baer said, fixation itself—by trying to protect unfixed works, we
have no possible basis under which we could provide that
protection, short of a constitutional amendment. 113
For those reasons, we argued, and I still sincerely believe, that
the district court decision was wrong.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Thank you, Bob.
We now have Marjorie Heins, from the Brennan Center for
Justice, Free Expression Policy Project.
MS. HEINS: I am going to go a little beyond the Martignon
case in order to give some history and background on the First
Amendment and free expression issues that are implicated. But I
will come back to it at the end.
I am, like David Patton, a relative latecomer to copyright law,
although I did, long ago, have the honor of clerking for Judge Ben
Kaplan. It was on a state supreme court, so we didn’t get many
copyright cases. But I did, because I was working for him, take a
look at his little masterwork, An Unhurried View of Copyright, and
I have to admit, not having any background in the subject, I found
it, although very witty, somewhat rough sledding.
My first real exposure to copyright was about ten years ago,
when I was a First Amendment lawyer at the ACLU. We First
Amendment lawyers pretty much viewed copyright as something
happening on a separate planet. I think copyright lawyers felt the
same thing about the First Amendment. The courts generally
reinforced that. When First Amendment issues were raised in
copyright cases, courts generally said fair-use and other freeexpression safeguards within the copyright statute itself or within
copyright common law take care of free-expression concerns, to
the extent there is a clash or a tension there between copyright
control and users’ rights to copy, exchange, or borrow parts of

112
113

See TRIPS, supra note 3.
See United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 423-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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existing works, for such purposes as education, criticism, news
reporting, or parody. 114
Well, it is 1994, and a case comes up to the Supreme Court
involving a rather raunchy rap music group called 2 Live Crew. 115
They did a parody version of the Roy Orbison song, “Oh! Pretty
Woman.” I said to my pals at the ACLU, “You know, there seem
to be some free-expression issues here. Let’s do an amicus brief.”
The ACLU sort of scratched its head and said, “Right.” So I had
the pleasure of reading a lot of the copyright cases and doing an
amicus brief 116 in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose.
I became fascinated enough by fair use that I am still
investigating the subject. In fact, the Brennan Center’s justpublished report, Will Fair Use Survive? Free Expression in the
Age of Copyright Control, is basically the report of an
investigation that the Center has done over the past year-and-ahalf, trying to get a sense of how well fair use is or is not working
for artists, writers, and others who contribute to culture and
democratic discourse. 117
The relevance of the Constitution, and in particular the First
Amendment, to copyright issues came to a head in Eldred v.
Ashcroft 118 in 2003, in which the Supreme Court upheld the
twenty-year extension of copyright, the Sonny Bono Copyright
Term Extension Act. 119 But although the statute was upheld, the
Court did say that the First Amendment was not entirely irrelevant
to copyright law. 120 The D.C. Circuit had thrown out the challenge
to that law, saying that copyright laws are categorically immune
from First Amendment challenge.121 The Supreme Court rejected
114

See, e.g., Authors League v. Oman, 790 F.2d 220, 223 (2d Cir. 1986).
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
116
Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (No. 92-1292), 1993 U.S. S. Ct. Brief
LEXIS 471.
117
MARJORIE HEINS & TRICIA BECKLES, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, WILL FAIR USE
SURVIVE? FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF COPYRIGHT CONTROL (2005), available at
http://www.fepproject.org/policyreports/WillFairUseSurvive.pdf.
118
537 U.S. 186 (2003).
119
Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2000)).
120
Id. at 219.
121
Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
115
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that. 122 They said that a blanket immunity was too broad and that,
in fact, although there are traditional safeguards in copyright law
for free expression, such as fair use, and the idea/expression
dichotomy, where these traditional contours of copyright law are
disrupted by Congress, then it would have to look at the First
Amendment implications of the copyright legislation. (The Court
didn’t make a big point of another noted free-expression safeguard
within copyright law, the “limited times” provision, which was
meant to ensure that things get into the public domain, because, of
course, that was the very problem that was confronting the Court
with this term extension.)
Even before the Supreme Court acknowledged the need for
First Amendment review of at least some copyright legislation in
Eldred, a couple of courts had imposed First Amendment scrutiny
on a copyright—or at least a copyright-like—statute, the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, or “DMCA.” 123 The DMCA imposes
restrictions both on circumventing digital rights management and
protection schemes for digital media, and even on distributing
circumvention tools. 124 In a couple of cases, including Universal
City Studios v. Corley 125 in the Second Circuit, which involved the
circumvention of a content-scrambling system for DVDs, the court
looked at the First Amendment arguments, including the argument
that the ban on circumvention unconstitutionally restricts fair
use. 126 For example, it interferes with the ability of scholars to
take one frame from a film for purposes of a classroom
presentation—a classic example of fair-use. The court applied
intermediate First Amendment scrutiny and upheld the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, saying that the right to fair use does
not include the right to access and copy material by the easiest or

122

Id. (citing San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S.
522 (1991)).
123
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000)).
124
Id.
125
273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
126
Id. at 436.
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most technologically effective method. 127 But the court did apply
First Amendment scrutiny. 128
So, clearly, there are constitutional limitations on the scope of
copyright legislation. I will give you an example from a case that
is still pending, which takes off where Eldred left off. The case is
Kahle v. Gonzales 129 (originally Kahle v. Ashcroft, 130 but of course
the attorney general keeps changing, so the titles keep changing).
Kahle is a challenge to what the plaintiffs call the change over time
from an opt-in to an opt-out system of copyright, or from a
conditional to an unconditional system, which was accomplished
through the elimination of copyright formalities, such as the notice
requirement, the registration requirement, the renewal-after-acertain-period-of-time requirement, the notion being that if you
weren’t interested in having copyright protection, your work would
go immediately into the public domain, and this was a public
good. 131 If you were interested in having copyright protection, for
example, but after the initial copyright term the work was no
longer of commercial value—or maybe the author had died and the
heirs weren’t interested—they would not renew, and so the work
would then go into the public domain. 132
So, over a period starting with the 1976 Copyright Act, 133
Congress moved from an opt-in to an opt-out system. The 1976
Act abolished the registration requirement, the requirement that the
work be deposited in the Library of Congress, and the renewal
requirement for works created after the effective date of the Act.
Then, the 1988 Berne Convention Implementation Act 134
eliminated the notice requirement prospectively. Finally, the
Renewal Act of 1992 135 provided, for the first time, an automatic
renewal—the copyright owner did not have to do anything; the
copyright was automatically renewed for works published between
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135

Id. at 459.
Id. at 449.
Kahle v. Ashcroft, 2004 WL 2663157 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
Kahle v. Ashcroft, No. 04-1127, 2004 WL 2663157 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
See id. at *3.
See id.
17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2000).
See BCIA, supra note 16, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
Copyright Amendments Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-307, 106 Stat. 264 (1992).
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1964 and 1977. By the time that statute had been passed, the
formalities had been pretty much eliminated, with the result that
the facts that the plaintiffs in Kahle alleged in the complaint were
pretty compelling. 136
They alleged that, starting in the early days of the copyright
system, only 5 percent of published works were registered. 137 So
you had a very free and open public domain. Through most of
U.S. history, the renewal rate was only 8–15 percent. 138
Here, the plaintiffs ran into a little trouble. I think they
understood that to challenge the entire change over time from a
conditional opt-in system to an unconditional opt-out system,
where everything is immediately copyrighted as soon as you
scribble it, would probably be a little more than the courts could
handle. So they started narrowing the focus of the case, to the
works published between 1964 and 1977, when, for the first time,
there was an automatic renewal, whether or not the holder of the
copyright wanted it. 139
Even there, even with that narrowing to that thirteen-year
period, they allege in the complaint, judging from past history of
copyright renewals, that if it hadn’t been for this law,
approximately 85 percent of those works would have entered the
public domain and been available for general distribution,
republication, and so forth. 140
That might have been an overstatement. As the legislative
history of the Renewal Act suggested, the Copyright Office was
concerned about copyrights that fell into the public domain
inadvertently. They weren’t renewed because of negligence,
ignorance, or inadvertence of the owners or the heirs. 141
So 85 percent may be a little high, but, still, it is probably a fair
inference—and, of course, the case has not been tried, because the
136

Kahle v. Ashcroft, 2004 WL 2663157 at *4.
Id. at *3.
138
Brief of the Brennan Center for Justice et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting PlaintiffAppellee and Reversal at 8, Kahle v. Ashcroft, No. 04-17434 (9th Cir. Jan. 28, 2005)
[hereinafter Brennan Center Brief].
139
Kahle, 2004 WL 2663157, at *5.
140
Brennan Center Brief, supra note 138, at 8.
141
Kahle, 2004 WL 2663157, at *14.
137
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district court dismissed it, and it is now up on appeal 142 —it is a fair
inference that there would be a lot more works in the public
domain from that period of 1964 to 1977, if not for the elimination
of the renewal requirement.
In addition, the Kahle plaintiffs pointed to the problem of
orphan works, which the Copyright Office has now recognized as
well. 143 Because there is no registration requirement and there is
no renewal requirement, it is very hard, in many, many cases, to
find out who the copyright owner is and to track them down. A lot
of work which could be freely copied—and this is documented in
the report “Will Fair Use Survive?” as well—it is especially a
problem among filmmakers. You have to get permission for
everything. If you can’t find the owner, your film may end up on
the cutting room floor.
The Kahle complaint had three claims under the Copyright
Clause—that this change to an unconditional system violated
various restrictions within the Copyright Clause of the
Constitution. 144 They also had a First Amendment claim, based on
the “change in the traditional—contours language” of Eldred. 145
All four claims were dismissed by the district court. The court did
not analyze the First Amendment claim in great depth, I think it is
fair to say. In one or two paragraphs, the court basically said,
“These are just procedural changes. They are not substantive, and
they certainly don’t amount to change-in-the-traditional-contours
of copyright.” 146
I got involved in Kahle by writing an amicus brief to the Ninth
Circuit on the plaintiffs’ appeal of the district court’s dismissal. 147
The brief was filed on behalf of the Brennan Center, the ACLU of
Northern California; Public Knowledge; the Center for the Public
Domain; and the First Amendment Project, a group in Oakland. 148

142
143
144
145
146
147
148

Kahle v. Ashcroft, No. 04-17434 (9th Cir. 2004).
Kahle, 2004 WL 2663157 at *5.
Kahle v. Ashcroft, No. 04-1127, 2004 WL 2663157 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
Kahle v. Ashcroft, 2004 WL 2663157 at *16.
Id. at *17.
Brennan Center Brief, supra note 138.
See id.

PANEL_3_TRANSCRIPT_091706_CLEAN

1252

9/17/2006 6:06:10 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 16:1223

We basically confined ourselves to the First Amendment
arguments in Kahle.
First, we acknowledged the government’s interests, especially
the interest in complying with the Berne Convention and the
interest in rescuing people who, because of inadvertence and
neglect, did not renew. 149 But we argued that even if you use a
First Amendment intermediate scrutiny standard, there still has to
be some effort at narrow tailoring by Congress. By switching to an
entirely unconditional system and basically freezing out of the
public domain thousands and thousands of works that would
otherwise be available, Congress had not chosen a very narrowly
tailored response to the problem that it perceived. 150
We also thought, why isn’t this a First Amendment overbreadth
case as well? The statute is substantially overbroad. It is attacking
a problem that Congress perceived, but there are a lot of narrower
ways of accomplishing the same goal.
So having come up with this substantial overbreadth First
Amendment argument in Kahle, I was pleased to see that in the
Martignon 151 case, there were two friend-of-the-court briefs
supporting the defendant and emphasizing the free expression
problems with the anti-bootlegging statute. One was from the
Internet Archive and three library associations.152 The other one
was from thirty-one IP and constitutional law professors. 153
The constitutional law professors’ brief argued that the antibootlegging statute is substantially overbroad and vague. 154 They
pointed to the First Amendment interest in making an unauthorized
copy of a public performance. 155 Having a record of such a
performance has independent value to both the speaker and those
149

See id. at 19.
See id. at 17-18.
151
United States v. Martignon, No. 04-5649-CR (2d Cir. argued July 12, 2005).
152
Brief of Internet Archive et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellee and
Affirmance, U.S. v. Martignon, No. 04-5649-cr (2d Cir. May 11, 2005) [hereinafter Brief
of Internet Archive].
153
Brief of Thirty-One Intellectual Property and Constitutional Law Professors as Amici
Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellee and Affirmance, U.S. v. Martignon, No. 04-5649cr (2d Cir. May 12, 2005).
154
See id. at 23–29.
155
See id. at 28.
150
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who would otherwise not hear it. It is this First Amendment value
that gives rise to First Amendment interests of both speakers and
listeners.
The brief from the Internet Archive and the library associations
gave specific examples of these free-expression cultural interests,
which are, I think, at the bottom of both the First Amendment and
the Copyright Clause. What are the interests in allowing
bootlegging to go on? This is from the brief of the Internet
Archive and the libraries:
“Few experiences compare to hearing live music. Whether
Rachmaninoff played on a Steinway or the Grateful Dead in the
midst of a twenty-two-minute improvised jam, every live
performance is a unique cultural artifact. Until recently, the
inspiration provided by these moments of creativity reached only a
limited audience and then was lost forever. The promise of digital
technology is that preservation on an unprecedented scale can
happen, and digital storage can preserve all of these fleeting
moments.” 156
They give further examples: The American Folklife Center
illustrates the importance of recording ephemeral performances to
the preservation and growth of our culture. The Folklife Center,
housed in the Library of Congress, features rare materials from the
WPA California Folk Music Project, ranging from Great
Depression recordings of blues and gospel songs from folk music
festivals around the country. The center recently celebrated its
acquisition of the Alan Lomax collection, an unparalleled
ethnographic documentation of the legendary folklorist during his
field trips to record artists such as Leadbelly, Woodie Guthrie,
Jellyroll Morton, and Muddy Waters. 157
“What is at stake for preservationists was recently dramatized
in a ten-CD box set released in 1997, The New York Philharmonic:
the Historic Broadcasts, 1923–87, which sold for $185.00,
consisting solely of live amateur recordings by devoted collectors.
The New York Philharmonic did not establish its own archive until
1960. These amateur recordings are all that remain of the live
156
157

Brief of Internet Archive, supra note 152, at 12–13.
Id. at 14.
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performances of some of the century’s greatest conductors,
including Toscanini, Stravinsky, and Bernstein. These priceless
live recordings capture an electricity ‘that more pristine studio
recordings lack.’” 158 That is a quote from a New York Times
article. “The Library of Congress recently discovered a 1957
Carnegie Hall concert featuring one of the only recordings ever
made of Thelonious Monk performing with John Coltrane,
originally recorded by the Voice of America and never aired in the
U.S.” 159
Finally, one last example from the Internet Archive brief:
“When musicologist Paul Jackson contemplated a book detailing
the weekly Metropolitan Opera performances broadcast from
1931–50, he discovered that recordings of only 20 percent of the
broadcasts still existed, many of which were bootlegs preserved by
fans.” 160
This, I hope, will give you a sense of the cultural and artistic
freedom interests on the defendant’s side of the Martignon case.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Thank you.
The final speaker is Jane Ginsburg, from Columbia Law
School.
PROFESSOR GINSBURG:
The legislation at issue in
161
Martignon
is what other countries of the world call a
“neighboring rights” statute.162 Bob Clarida is correct that our
§ 1101 is a performer’s-rights statute. It is not an author’s-right
statute; most countries, other than the U.S., distinguish authors
(creators of works) from performers (interpreters of works). The

158
Allan Kozinn, Critic’s Notebook: Bootlegging as a Public Service: No This Isn’t a
Joke, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1997, at E2.
159
Brief of Internet Archive, supra note 152, at 19.
160
Id.
161
U.S. v. Martignon, 364 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
162
See, e.g., Collective management of copyright and related rights: What is protection
of
related
rights?,
http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/about_collective_mngt.html
#P31_2900 (“‘[R]elated rights’, also known as ‘neighboring rights’ . . . are the rights that
belong to the performers, the producers of phonograms and broadcasting organizations in
relation to their performances, phonograms and broadcasts respectively.”).
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United States, however, has since the 1976 Act, 163 if not since the
1972 amendment bringing sound recordings within the scope of
federal copyright, 164 put performers whose works are fixed in
sound recordings in the same basket as authors. The Copyright
law defines a sound recording as the fixation of the sounds of the
performance. 165 That means the performer is a co-author of a
work of authorship that is fixed.
Although the 1976 Act turns on fixation, the distinction
between (1) a recorded performance of a work, (2) the
simultaneous fixation of a performance as it is being transmitted—
a point that I will return to—and (3) a performance that is not
recorded—at least not with authorization—at the time that it is
being performed, may not make a lot of sense if we are trying to
ascertain the nature of a performer’s authorship. The nature of the
creative activity—the interpretative performance of a musical or
other work—seems to me to be the same, regardless of whether or
not some kind of tangible rendition also results from it. If the
originality of the interpretation of the work is what makes a
performer a statutory “author” 166 (once the performance has been
“fixed”), it is not clear to me why performers would not also be
“authors” of unfixed works. What should count for authorship is
the level of creativity, not the mechanical task of generating a
tangible record of the creation. Congress should, then, have power
under the Copyright Clause, to secure exclusive rights for limited
times to these authors. That is, assuming that fixation or
tangibility is not a constitutional prerequisite, a question to which I
will later turn.
The statute Martignon challenges implements the United
States’ obligation under Article 14 of the TRIPS agreement to
protect the rights of performers against the unauthorized fixation,

163

General Revision of Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 101, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2000)).
164
Sound recordings first eligible for copyright in 1972. See Copyright Registration for
Sound Recordings, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE CIRCULAR 56 (Dec. 2004), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ56.html.
165
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
166
See HR Rep. No. 94-553 (1976) (discussing elements of originality of a sound
recording).

PANEL_3_TRANSCRIPT_091706_CLEAN

1256

9/17/2006 6:06:10 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 16:1223

distribution, and transmission of their live performances. 167 A
similar obligation exists in Article 6 of the WIPO Performances
and Phonograms Treaty, which the U.S. has also ratified. 168
What is the source of Congress’ authority to enact legislation
that would achieve the protections we are obliged to provide? One
source would be the Copyright Clause. 169 Another source would
be the Commerce Clause. 170 A third source referred to might be
the treaty power, since the question arises in an international
context. 171
The questions I will address are: first, does Congress have
power under the Copyright Clause to protect unfixed
performances? Second, if Congress does not, does it have the
necessary authority under the Commerce Clause and/or treaty
power? If it does, do the limitations on Congress’ power that are
contained in the Copyright Clause—limited times, and—perhaps—
tangible rendition—carry over to other sources of congressional
power? This is what Bill referred to as the dormant Copyright
Clause issue. David also referred to it in his discussion of the
Moghadam 172 case, with respect to the question whether legislation
under some other source of authority would be fundamentally
inconsistent with other limitations on Congress’ power.
With respect to whether Congress has power under the
Copyright Clause to protect unfixed performances, one would first
inquire whether these performances are the “writings” of an
“author”? For the reasons given above, the argument can be made
that a performer is an author: if a performer’s interpretation makes
her a co-author of a sound recording, I think the same
interpretation would make her an author even absent the fixation.
But that argument addresses only the “Authors” element of the
Copyright Clause.
We must also consider the “Writings”
component. Does the Constitution, in giving Congress power to
167

TRIPS, supra note 3.
World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty,
Apr. 12, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17 (1997) [hereinafter WPPT].
169
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
170
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
171
U.S. CONST. art. II, §2.
172
175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999). See also Patton, supra note 51.
168
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protect the “Writings” of “Authors”—require that the work have
previously assumed tangible form?
Even if “Writings”
presupposes tangibility, does that tangible form have to have been
achieved with the author’s permission?
David referred to the Burrow-Giles 173 case, which describes
the writings of authors as all works “through which the ideas in the
mind of the author are given visible expression.” 174 Does that
imply that Congress has power to protect only works that are given
visible expression, and that invisible—i.e. auditory—expressions
therefore are excluded? Such an interpretation inappropriately
reads a negative inference into a statement that the Court, in
context, had pronounced to make clear that the Constitution gives
Congress very broad authority. At issue in Burrow-Giles was
whether or not Congress had power to include photographs within
the subject matter of copyright. Defendant had claimed that their
mechanical qualities placed photographs beyond the zone of
“writings” of “authors.”
The court embraced “visual
expression”—of which photographs were obviously an example—
in the course of rejecting that argument. Tangibility was not an
issue in Burrow-Giles. But one might infer from the Court’s
ecumenical concept of creativity that, had the question of
tangibility been posed, the Court would not have denied Congress’
power to protect unfixed creations on the ground that they lacked
authorship.
To my knowledge, no decision before Martignon held that a
“Writing” in the constitutional sense must be tangible. Rather, it
has just been assumed that a writing must be tangible. 175

173

Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884). See also Patton,
supra note 51.
174
Id.
175
See, e.g., Martignon, at n.11 (“The Moghadam Court ‘assume[s] arguendo, without
deciding, that [the fact that live musical performances are not in a fixed, tangible and
durable form] would preclude the use of the Copyright Clause as a source of
Congressional power for the anti-bootlegging statute.’” (quoting U.S. v. Moghadam, 175
F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 1999))). Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (protecting
“Authors . . . exclusive right to their . . . Writings”) with 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000)
(protecting “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression”).
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If, however, the Constitution did require that a work have been
fixed before it could be deemed a “Writing,” then one feature of
the current Copyright Act would be problematic. The 1976
Copyright Act’s definition of fixation includes works that are
being transmitted and simultaneously fixed with the
transmission. 176 The legislative history gives the example of a
sports broadcast. 177 A football game is being broadcast live. The
filming of the football game meets the creativity criterion of an
original work of authorship because of the director’s creative
choice of camera angles and such, but the broadcast is live, so the
audiovisual work is not fixed. Congress, perceiving that live
broadcasts could be vulnerable to unauthorized exploitations,
modified the fixation concept to allow for fixation simultaneous
with transmission (the broadcaster is recording the filming of the
game at the same time as it is broadcasting it). Because of its
simultaneous fixation, the live broadcast thus comes within the
scope of the federal power. 178 This is a bit of sleight of hand,
because anyone recording that transmission off the television is
recording the live feed before the fixed version comes into being,
so Congress is in fact extending copyright to cover works before
they are made tangible. But if the Constitution conditions the
federal copyright power on a work’s preexisting tangibility, then
the simultaneous fixation rule, by covering works in pre-tangible
form, would be vulnerable.
I am not sure, however, that the Constitution in fact requires
tangibility. The Framers may have assumed the tangible character
of a copyrighted work, but a lot of things were assumed, given the
state of technology and commercial practices in 1787. 179 That
176

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (“A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are
being transmitted, is ‘fixed’ for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being
made simultaneously with its transmission.”).
177
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, 52 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N 5659, 5665.
178
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
179
Commentators have asserted that “writings” must imply permanence, lest the term be
meaningless, see, e.g., 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 1.08[C][2], at 1-66.30 (Matthew Bender 2005) (1963), but we should be wary of
attributing to the Framers an intent to set the subject matter of copyright into the mold of
the technology and commercial practices they would have found familiar. The
Moghadam court’s quotation of Learned Hand on this point is worth reiterating here:
“Rejecting the notion that the Constitution ‘embalms inflexibly the habits of 1789,’ Judge
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does not mean that what was assumed was also required. It is
important to distinguish what is constitutionally permissible from
what is constitutionally mandated. One might draw a parallel with
the argument made in Kahle v. Ashcroft that the progressive
diminution in statutory formalities starting with the 1976 Act
renders the current copyright law subject to first amendment
challenge. 180 Yes, we have had formalities from the start. Does
that mean that they were constitutionally mandated, as opposed to
constitutionally permissible? The Northern District of California
declined to assign a constitutional dimension to formalities. By the
same token, one might recognize that tangibility has been with us
from the beginning, but that doesn’t mean that it is mandated.
Can the concept of a “Writing” include incipient fixations, such
as simultaneous fixations with transmissions? Can it include other
works which are in the process of becoming fixed? Can the United
States constitutionally adopt a solution such as that applied in the
U.K. 1988 Copyright Act, 181 which requires fixation, but includes
within the concept of fixation a work that is being fixed without
authorization? 182 The work must be rendered tangible, but the
rendering may occur without the author’s permission. Once the
work is rendered tangible, whether or not with authorization, it
comes within the scope of the U.K. Copyright Act (and the
unauthorized fixation violates the reproduction right). 183 Section
1101 in effect adopts the U.K. approach, at least with respect to the
creation of copies. Thus, even if the Constitution required fixation,
§ 1101 would still be constitutionally permissible, so long as the
Constitution did not also require that the fixation occur with
permission. This approach does not, however, save all of § 1101,
because that text not only gives the performer the right to fix the
Learned Hand wrote that the Copyright Clause’s ‘grants of power to Congress comprise
not only what was then known, but what the ingenuity of men should devise thereafter.
Of course, the new subject matter must have some relation to the grant, but we interpret
by the general practice of civilized people in similar fields, for it is not a strait-jacket but
a charter for a living people.’ Reiss v. National Quotation Bureau, 276 F. 717, 719
(S.D.N.Y.1921).” Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1274 n.8.
180
Kahle v. Ashcroft, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24090, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1888
(N.D. Cal. 2004).
181
Copyrights, Designs and Patents Act of 1988, ch. 48, § 164 (U.K.).
182
See id.
183
Id.
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work, but also to transmit the work as unfixed. 184
The
constitutional text may pose an additional impediment: the clause
permits Congress to secure exclusive rights to authors “to their . . .
Writings . . .” (emphasis supplied). The Constitution thus
designates the creative person as the subject of copyright. 185 If
“Writings” means that the work must at least be in the process of
assuming physical form, does it also imply that the creator must
personally be fixing the work or authorizing its fixation? If so,
then the Constitution would foreclose the U.K. approach. If, on
the other hand, prior fixation were not a constitutional prerequisite,
then recourse to the U.K. approach would not be necessary.
For purposes of this discussion, however, let us assume that
“Writings” does mean preexisting, or at least simultaneous,
tangibility. In that case, the performances that are covered by
§ 1101 might indeed fall outside the scope of the Copyright Act.
In that event, does Congress lack power to grant performers’
fixation and transmission rights? I think it is fairly clear, as has
been indicated by most of the speakers, that this legislation
concerns interstate and international commerce; Congress thus
would have power under the Commerce Clause. But we then
confront the question whether the limitations that are contained
within the Copyright Clause constrain Congress’ power under
other sources of authority.
Martignon 186 is not the first copyright case to raise the problem
of inter-clausal conflict. The issue came to the fore after Feist, 187
when the Supreme Court stated that sweat-of-the-brow
compilations lack originality, and thus are not writings of authors.
They therefore do not come within Congress’ power to protect
under the Copyright Clause. 188 (The Court’s frequent iteration of
the constitutional character of originality was, arguably, dicta,
because the Court also held that the statute did not purport to cover

184
185
186
187
188

17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000).
But see 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (works made for hire).
United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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unoriginal compilations; Congress’ power to protect such
collections thus was not in fact at issue.) 189
Feist left open the question whether, notwithstanding the lack
of Copyright Clause authority, these valuable collections of
information could be protected under the Commerce Clause. 190
That spawned a fair amount of academic writing, inspired by
Railway Labor v. Gibbons 191 (a case Bob Clarida earlier
discussed), 192 speculating whether the originality limitation in the
Copyright Act would carry over to the Commerce Clause. 193 The
two constraints at issue in Martignon are fixation (“Writings”) and
duration (“limited Times”). 194 If the live performance is not a
writing, does that foreclose Congress from affording protection
under another source of constitutional authority? Even if Congress
can protect non-writings, does the limited-times constraint prohibit
Congress from making that protection perpetual?
There are two reasons the “Writings” term should not preclude
federal legislation. One concerns subject matter, the other the
scope of rights protected. The first relates to the Supreme Court’s
19th-century decision in the Trademark Cases. 195 One of the first
federal trademarks acts had declared itself to be legislation under
the Patent and Copyright Clause. 196 The Supreme Court held that
a trademark is neither a writing nor an invention; Congress
therefore lacked power under that source of authority to enact a
trademarks act. But the Court also indicated that the Commerce
Clause could supply the requisite authority. 197
Congress
subsequently legislated under the aegis of the Commerce Clause. I
doubt anyone today would seriously dispute Congress’ power to
189

Feist, 499 U.S. at 352–56.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
191
455 U.S. 457 (1982).
192
See supra note 69 and accompanying text (Robert Clarida presentation).
193
See, e.g., Thomas Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 272 (2004); Paul Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Constraints on
Congressional Power: Construing the Intellectual Property Clause, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV.
1119 (2000); Jane C. Ginsburg, No Sweat? Copyright and Other Protection for Works of
Information after Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338 (1992).
194
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
195
100 U.S. 82 (1879).
196
Trademark Legislation of Congress Act, U.S. Rev. Stat., ch. 2, tit. 60, §§ 4937–4947.
197
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
190
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enact trademark laws. As a result, the exclusion of the disputed
subject matter from the constitutional ambit of copyright does not,
standing alone, mean that the subject matter is inapt for protection
on some other constitutional basis.
The inquiry should instead focus on the policies underlying the
exclusion from copyright of the disputed subject matter. Do the
limitations in the Copyright Clause embody fundamental policies
that should limit Congress’ ability to act under some other clause?
In other words, can Congress evade a substantive limitation of its
power that is imposed under the Copyright Clause simply by
saying—if I can use Bill’s prop—“I now take off the Copyright
Clause hat and put on the Commerce Clause hat, and I am free of
all constraints that came with the former fashion item?”
The two limitations warrant different analyses. I have
difficulty perceiving a fundamental public policy in the “Writing”
limitation, if indeed it is a limitation at all. The usual reason for
having a tangibility or fixation requirement is proof. It is easier for
the author to establish her creativity if the work has previously
been fixed. That is a matter of judicial economy and litigation
convenience; it is not at all apparent that those interests rise to the
level of fundamental policy. 198 By contrast, limited-times is a
fundamental policy and should not be so easily evaded. The
Constitution forbids the vesting of perpetual property rights in
Writings and Discoveries. The key here is the nature of the
protection that Congress is affording. Perpetuity per se does not
necessarily offend the Constitution; rather, it is necessary to
examine the rights that Congress is making perpetual. In the case
of § 1101, Congress is providing copyright-like protection—the
198

One might contend that prior fixation promotes free speech because a member of the
public who encounters a work in unfixed form need not fear assertion of another’s
proprietary rights should she incorporate the overheard musical work into her own
composition. Cf. Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990) (facts
and ideas are excluded from the scope of copyright protection because it would be
unrealistic to hold the public accountable for elements it so commonly absorbs). The
contention proves too much, however, because it would make fixation a prerequisite not
only to initial protection, but to infringement. The statute does not require that the
alleged infringer have encountered the work in tangible form; once the work has been
fixed, it is protected in all its guises, including via a live performance. Indeed, the fixed
version need not even be publicly accessible.
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rights to make and distribute copies, and to transmit are all
exclusive rights (i.e., property rights) afforded copyrighted works
under § 106 of the Copyright Act. 199 Section 1101 thus looks like
a simple change of haberdashery; the head (the exclusive rights)
being the covered remains the same. The claim that Copyright
Clause limitations should carry over to Commerce Clause
enactments thus is persuasive.
One might object that trademark protection is potentially
perpetual, yet the Supreme Court has implicitly blessed resort to
the Commerce Clause in that instance.
But while trademark
registrations are infinitely renewable, the nature and scope of
trademark protection are quite different from copyright protection.
Trademark protection is not a right in gross. It is not a general
right to prevent the copying of the distinctive sign or design. It is a
right vested in the trademark owner to preserve truth in the
marketplace by prohibiting those uses of the mark that are likely to
confuse the consumer, 200 or that constitute false representations of
the origin or qualities of the goods or services in question. 201 The
trademark owner serves as a proxy for the broader public
interest. 202 Viewed in that light, a federal trademark registration’s
indefinite renewability should not be problematic. Where, by
contrast, the nature of the right is, to use the Moghadam 203 court’s
terminology, a copyright-like right, mere resort to the Commerce
Clause, or, for that matter to the treaty power, 204 should not
suffice. 205

199

17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
See Lanham Act, § 32.
201
Id. § 43(a).
202
The Federal Anti Dilution Act, Lanham Act § 43(c), does provide protection for
famous marks even in the absence of consumer confusion, and thus more closely
resembles an exclusive right than does traditional trademarks protection. For an
argument why § 43(c) nonetheless is not constitutionally vulnerable, see Brian Jacobs,
Note, Trademark Dilution on the Constitutional Edge, 104 COLUMBIA L. REV. 161
(2004). In addition, courts have interpreted § 43(c) restrictively. See Clarisa Long,
Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029 (2006).
203
United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999).
204
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
205
But see Kiss Catalog v Passport Int’l. Prods., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37671 (C.D. Cal.
2005) (upholding § 1101 against constitutional challenge on the ground that if the statute’s
subject matter falls outside copyright clause, then none of the clause’s limitations apply).
200
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Consider another example: let’s suppose an international antihate speech treaty has been promulgated (this is certainly
conceivable, since many other countries seem to have a much
lower tolerance for hate speech than we do). Suppose the U.S.
ratified such a treaty, and that Congress, invoking its power to
enact legislation necessary and proper to implement agreements
concluded under the treaty power, 206 passed a variety of
restrictions on the expression of hate speech. That legislation
should pose a serious First Amendment problem, 207
notwithstanding that the treaty power is an additional source of
congressional authority. The treaty power would not exempt
Congress from the injunction that it shall “make no law” abridging
freedom of speech. One has to look at the question of whether
there is a fundamental conflict in basic policy.
So my bottom line is not so different from Bill’s. 208 I think
that Congress has power to enact a performers’ rights statute, but
the term must be limited. TRIPS requires a minimum of fifty years
of protection from fixation. 209 Similarly, the minimum term of
protection set out in the WIPO Performances and Phonograms
Treaty is fifty years. 210 We could provide a longer term, for
example, ninety-five years from the performance, but fifty seems
ample.
The term of protection also makes me think about the historical
benefits or cultural benefits of bootleg recordings. I am delighted
to learn from Marjorie Heins that I have a First Amendment
interest in obtaining a copy of a performance that I wouldn’t
otherwise hear, and therefore that I needn’t worry about affording
an expensive subscription to the Metropolitan Opera. 211 But I
assume that that is not really what the First Amendment argument
seeks to prove.

206

See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
208
See supra notes 1–50 and accompanying text (William Patry presentation).
209
TRIPS, supra note 3, at Part II, § 1, art. 12.
210
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, ch. IV, art. 17, Dec. 20, 1996, S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17 (1997); 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997).
211
See supra notes 114–160 and accompanying text (Marjorie Heins presentation).
207
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Many of the examples Marjorie gave concerned performances
that were recorded with permission. The unauthorized recordings
were by and large, very old. Perhaps, if Congress redrafts § 1101
to impose a time limit on the performer’s right, it might consider
some kind of exception for historic recordings. But any exception
would still have to meet our treaty obligations. For example,
limiting the violation to the distribution or other communication of
the performance, for a period of fifty years following the
performance might sound attractive, for it would thus be possible
for anyone to create and retain historical copies, for example for an
archive. Whether or not the performer created the archive, there
would be a recording of performance that could be made public
fifty years later. But this scheme is not consistent with TRIPs art.
14, because the act of fixation would not be actionable without
further communication of the fixed performance. TRIPs and the
WPPT require that “performers shall have the possibility of
preventing . . . the [unauthorized] fixation of their unfixed
performance and the reproduction of such fixation.” 212 This right
is independent of the communication right. According to the
WPPT, any exceptions to the performer’s fixation right must be
consistent with the “three step test,” which limits exceptions to
“certain special cases, which do not conflict with the normal
exploitation of the work, and do not reasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the rights holder.” 213 The suggested revision
of § 1101 is in tension with the first step, as the exception to the
fixation right would not be confined to certain special cases, but
would be across the board of performances. Moreover, such an
exception would also fall afoul of the second and third steps: even
if the members of the public who fix the performances do not
further distribute or communicate them, they will nonetheless have
captured for themselves the economic and enjoyment value of an
authorized fixation.
Equally importantly, defining the performer’s fixation right to
allow anyone present to fix a performance on the theory that fifty
years later the fixation might have historical value is a bad idea
independently of its inconsistency with our treaty obligations. The
212
213

See also WIPO Performers and Phonograms Treaty, art. 6(ii).
Id. at art. 16(2).
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archival exceptions contained in the copyright act are narrowly
drawn; they do not allow or encourage members of the public to
appoint themselves “archivists” and thus enjoy certain copying
privileges. 214 Most significantly, in addition to the economic
values the fixation right protects, there are moral and artistic
considerations of which we should not lose sight. Not every
performer may wish to have every performance preserved for
posterity. 215 The ephemeral quality of a live performance may
promote a spontaneity and experimentation that could be
discouraged if the artist knew or feared that anyone could create a
record of the performance.
If, however, Congress does not have power to protect unfixed
performances, because they (1) are not writings and because
(2) the writings condition limited Congress’ power under other
constitutional founts of authority, then Congress cannot cure the
problems with § 1101 by specifying a limited term for the
performers’ rights. No matter how short the term under § 1101,
Congress would not have power, period. That outcome is neither
desirable nor, for that matter, correct.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I know Bill Patry wants to respond to
things. I know other panelists want to respond to each other. But
our audience has been sitting very patiently, so I would like to start
out with questions or comments from the audience. Then we will
be sure to give everyone on the panel a chance to make whatever
comments they want.
Could you state your name and affiliation?
QUESTION: My name is Richard Field, no affiliation.
I guess this is one of Jane’s points. Technology changes lots of
things. It is hard, in a lot of areas, to know what the original intent
of the framers was because of technology changes. But I would
think that in this area, of all areas, it is not hard. Sure, they didn’t
214

See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 108(a) (setting out characteristics of and requirements for
libraries and archives to engage in certain acts of reproduction and distribution);
17 U.S.C. § 112 (licensed transmitting organizations’ ephemeral recordings for archival
purposes).
215
Interview with Barbara Haws, Archivist/Historian, New York Philharmonic (on file
with author).
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have TV, but at the time of the Constitution being written and for
hundreds of years before, people got up and made speeches
constantly. They were orators. Everybody was an orator. Did
they approve of somebody then making the same speech the next
day or did they disapprove of it? That goes to both the First
Amendment, freedom of speech, and to copyright.
You would think that over the centuries there was some view
on that, and it is really no different from the view now, so that that,
in some way, is enshrined—it may have been common wisdom at
the time, but it is enshrined in what ends up being written in terms
of both the First Amendment and copyright in the Constitution.
Is there nothing, over all the centuries, about that simple issue?
MR. PATTON: There are cases on this. It comes up in theater
a lot. Playwrights didn’t want to set things down for fear of it
getting out. There are nineteenth-century cases in which an
audience member would either memorize or write down lines and
then go perform it somewhere else. There were common-law
copyright solutions to that. 216
PROFESSOR GINSBURG: The issue wouldn’t have come up,
because, up until 1976, the dividing line was publication. 217 So
whether the work was tangible and not published or not tangible
and not published was all the domain of state law. That is a reason
that the issue simply wouldn’t have been presented before the
federal courts.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Someone else?
QUESTION: My name is Travis Uhlenhopp. I am a third-year
student from Pepperdine.
I want to start by thanking Mr. Patry for providing the basis of
the National Entertainment Moot Court Competition that we
hosted. His statute was one of the main issues. That is why I am
here today.
MR. PATRY: I love to amuse.
216

See, e.g., Thomkins v. Halleac, 133 Mass. 32 (1882); Keene v. Kimball, 82 Mass.
545 (1860).
217
See The Copyright Act of 1909 § 10, reprinted in 8 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT app. 6 (Matthew Bender 2005) (1963).

PANEL_3_TRANSCRIPT_091706_CLEAN

1268

9/17/2006 6:06:10 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 16:1223

QUESTIONER: I think Ms. Ginsburg brought this up, but how
do you respond to the disjunctive nature of the statute as it
affects—apparently, the smoke has cleared, and it has been under
the Commerce Clause that it was enacted. How is it that simply
fixing or recording something itself, without distribution, without
selling it, affects interstate commerce?
That was one of the main arguments against the Commerce
Clause.
MR. PATRY: How does renting a motel room in Alabama
affect interstate commerce? You think it either reaches those
things or it doesn’t, and the Supreme Court thought it did. 218 We
were concerned with tours that go across the country. You
certainly could find somebody who exists in a bar in—well, I
won’t name a place, because someone will be offended—some
area, where that is the only bar they have ever sung in and they are
lucky to sing there. You would say, if someone in the audience
fixes that, how is that going to affect interstate commerce? I don’t
think that is how it works. I think it works on a much more gross
level. Certainly, this sort of protection covers activity which, on
the whole—and perhaps almost entirely on the whole—isn’t
interstate commerce.
Maybe performers would like to be treated like baseball stars
and have an antitrust exemption. But I think that is an anomaly,
too.
QUESTIONER: So was it intentional to make just fixing it
illegal, as well?
MR. PATRY: The one thing I did try to do was to make sure it
wasn’t illegal to buy them, because I like to go down to the Village
and buy them. So I did take care of myself.
The issue did come up once before, in 1984, when the first of
the real sui generis provisions came into the statute, which is the
Semiconductor Chip Act. 219 There was a concern not about
commerce, but a concern about them being writings. Perhaps they
were just merely mechanical things, and perhaps they weren’t
218
219

W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901–912 (2000).

PANEL_3_TRANSCRIPT_091706_CLEAN

2006]

ANTI-BOOTLEGGING LAW CASES

9/17/2006 6:06:10 PM

1269

original. Perhaps they were part of a process. So Congress did
sort of a belt-and-suspenders thing there. If you look at the
infringement part of that statute, you will see that it is only an
infringement of the statute if you distribute your thing in
commerce. 220
So Congress has, in the past, evidenced some discomfort on the
issue. Whether we should have expressed discomfort this time I
don’t know, but I don’t think so.
One quick point I want to make is the issue of whether the
Supreme Court or anyone else has ever dealt with the issue of
tangibility. What we relied upon, which I think is still correct, is
the statement in the Supreme Court’s Goldstein, opinion, that
writings may be interpreted to include any physical—physical—
rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or artistic labor. 221 I
take Jane’s point about Burrow-Giles. 222 I think that is absolutely
right. But I interpret “physical” there to mean “physical.” You
have to have a tangible thing.
PROFESSOR GINSBURG: But those were pirate disks, not
bootleg disks.
MR. PATRY: Sure, but they were talking about what a writing
is.
PROFESSOR GINSBURG: I know, but, again, the issue . . .
PROFESSOR HANSEN: It was dicta. There was tangibility in
that case, so it is dicta.
MR. PATRY: You say “tomayto,” I say “tomawto.”
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Basically, what Chief Justice Berger
said in other things hasn’t held up well today, so I am not sure how
much that is going to be . . .
MR. PATRY: If he’s so smart, why isn’t he alive, I guess.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: On the Commerce Clause question, I
think the issue is basically, does the Court think Congress has a
220

17 U.S.C. § 910(a) (2000) (“[A]ny person who violates any of the exclusive rights of
the owner of a mask work under this chapter, by conduct in or affecting commerce, shall
be liable as an infringer of such rights.”).
221
Goldstein v. Cal., 412 U.S. 546 (1993).
222
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
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role to do this or not? It has different views about this. You had
Chief Justice Marshall, McCulloch v. Maryland, 223 who had a
broad view of the role of Congress, adopt an approach to the
necessary and proper clause that was very broad. Then you had
the Supreme Court in the 1890s to about 1928, 1930, drop any use
of the necessary and proper clause and take a relatively narrow
view of the scope of congressional power under the Commerce
Clause—leaving it is up to the states to address many problems.
The real issue has been the respective legislative roles of
Congress and the states, with the Court in some periods looking
out to protect state autonomy and others actually encouraging
Congress to address many social and economic issues. Recently,
there have been a few 5–4 decisions where the majority reserved
some minor areas for state control but not radically the broad view
of congressional power that has predominated in the twentieth
century. I don’t think anyone thinks that this bootleg legislation is
an intrusion upon state autonomy. So I don’t think that traditional
policy issue is in play here.
The one case everyone points to where you don’t have a state
autonomy issue and where the Court found a congressional statute
unconstitutional for lack of power is the Railway Labor case,
which involved the constitutional provision giving Congress
bankruptcy power. 224 The congressional statute involved was, in
effect, a private law to help a union and its employees and
overturned a bankruptcy decision dissolving the railroad. The
district court enjoined the application of the Act because it
amounted to an unlawful taking, the Seventh Circuit affirmed and
Justice Stevens, in refusing to grant a stay, agreed that it would
probably be considered an unlawful taking by the full Court.
Congress sought to avoid the takings issue by amending the law to
make clear that the railroad could pursue damages against the
government. The trial court again enjoined the implication of the
Act and the Seventh Circuit affirmed on the basis that the Act
constituted an uncompensated taking. The Supreme Court avoided
a problematic takings issue, that could have broad implications in
223

17 U.S. 316 (1819).
Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 448 U.S. 1301 (1980); Railway Labor
Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982).
224
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recognizing damages for congressional enactments. Instead, it
took the easy way out by using the Bankruptcy Clause which
would have no effect on Congress other than to stop private laws
overturning bankruptcy decisions.
Moreover, there is another difference between Railway Labor
and this case. In the former, Congress retained its full power to
deal with bankruptcies. It was only prohibited from private relief
for one party. Under Judge Baer’s decision, Congress would be
deprived of all power to deal with bootlegging, leaving the states
alone to deal with it. And the states are not equipped to deal with
it effectively, and no one argues that they are.
In short, I think Railway Labor, despite some broad language
from Justice Rehnquist, is in reality sui generis and won’t have
much effect in binding the court in the future on Commerce Clause
power.
Therefore, I think Jane on the tangibility issue is absolutely
right. If you take Burrow-Giles, they said, “The framers didn’t
think about photographers. Therefore, they didn’t include it.” 225
You just apply that. The framers didn’t think that you could be
bootlegging. There wasn’t the technology or anything else.
Certainly they would have been allowing that now. If you can
have a photographer considered to be an author, it is much less of a
stretch to say that a writing doesn’t have to be tangible.
Especially, since the framers could have chosen “creators” and
instead chose “authors.” On its face, this excluded painters,
sculptors and other creators. So there was a textual and historical
argument to exclude photographers.” 226
So I think the Court will not find “writings” an obstacle to the
lack of tangibility of performances that are bootlegged.
But I have one question on your constitutional attack on the
length of protection of the bootlegging statute. How does your
client have standing under Article III to raise it? 227 Even if you
have a constitutional wrong, you still need to show causation—that
he has been harmed by that provision. But he was prosecuted only
225
226
227

Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. 53.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. III.
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a few years after the passage of the Act. Thus, the unconstitutional
length of life plus seventy, or even life plus fifty, would not have
caused his harm, i.e., prosecution. So the constitutional wrong of
too long a term hasn’t caused any harm to him. So he would not
have standing to raise the too long a term argument, although he
could raise the tangibility issue.
So where does he get standing to raise this?
MR. PATTON: It was a facial challenge. There is nothing in
the record to suggest whether this stuff is older than fifty years or
not.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: So you can just get past Article III
standing by a facial challenge?
QUESTION: Does Article III standing apply to a criminal
defense matter?
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Actually, in criminal defense, they
even have tougher standing laws. You have a third-party standing
rule. I violate, purposely, going into your house without a warrant,
on the Fourth Amendment. You have five other people in there.
You are the only one who can raise that standing issue. The other
four people cannot raise the unconstitutional search issue because
they had no privacy interest in that house. In criminal cases,
ironically, the standing rules are stricter.
QUESTION: Is that Article III?
PROFESSOR HANSEN:
No, it’s not an Article III
requirement. The people in the house had Article III standing,
because there was a constitutional wrong—the illegal search, it
caused them harm—the prosecution. But the Supreme Court has
consistently said that “On a policy basis, for prudential reasons, we
are not going to let so-called third parties raise the constitutional
challenges.”
Anyone else on a different issue?
PROFESSOR GINSBURG: May I just provide an additional
answer to your question? TRIPS Article 14 requires member states

PANEL_3_TRANSCRIPT_091706_CLEAN

2006]

ANTI-BOOTLEGGING LAW CASES

9/17/2006 6:06:10 PM

1273

to protect against the fixation of their unfixed performances and
the reproduction of such fixation. 228
QUESTION: I know you have addressed this tangibility issue
in quite detail, so I will just ask—
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Name and affiliation.
QUESTIONER: Mark Jaffe, third-year student, Fordham
Intellectual Property Law Journal, and research assistant for
Professor Hansen.
I won’t ask you to go over it again. But I am curious as to why
those whose interest it is to support this congressional legislation
or defending it have been so quick to dismiss the argument that it
is proper; why the tangibility issue has been assumed and not
argued.
MR. PATRY: I don’t think it is true that it has been assumed.
We thought about it a lot. After deep thought and research, we
came to the conclusion that fixation is a constitutional requirement.
We didn’t assume anything.
I understand that there are people who disagree, but it is not
accurate to say that we assumed anything. We did take seriously
how we could do it.
I don’t defend the term, which I think is indefensible. But I
think that is a separate issue. I understand that that has a big
impact.
But for your question, we did think a lot about that, and we did
talk to a lot of people about it as well. If you go back through
some of the legislative history of the 1976 act, 229 you will find
statements by Register of Copyrights Abraham Kaminstein that
writings require fixation, in exactly those terms. 230 Maybe you
could say that was assumed because he just said it and he didn’t
cite to anything. Well, what are you going to cite to? I will cite to
the Supreme Court’s Goldstein opinion. 231 You can cite to a
common-sense interpretation of what “writings” means. Maybe
228
229
230
231

TRIPS, supra note 3, at Part II, § 1, art. 14.
See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, 52 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N 5659.
Testified before the House Judiciary May 1975–76 CIS H 4213.
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
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that is my common sense. Certainly, I think in the Burrow-Giles
case there is a question about whether writings in common sense
means just literary works. 232 I don’t purport to put forth that my
interpretation of something is the only one.
I do purport to say, however, that it was an issue we took
seriously and I believe we came to the right conclusion.
PROFESSOR GINSBURG: What do you think about
simultaneous fixation?
MR. PATRY: I think it is fine, with this caveat. I don’t see a
requirement of preexisting fixation. I see a requirement of
fixation. So if you are simultaneously taping something while it is
being transmitted, I think you have a protectable work.
The only issue I have with that is—and this would occur at a
jazz club or a club where someone is improvising, where it is not
being simultaneously transmitted.
PROFESSOR GINSBURG: It’s being simultaneously fixed,
but not transmitted.
MR. PATRY: Yes, right. That’s the one where I would say,
no, there is no violation of the Copyright Act there. I am
confessing to being, maybe, incredibly inconsistent. I try to be
honest, even being inconsistent.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: You would be copying a live work.
MR. PATRY: Right, you would be copying, I think, a live
work.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Congress’ broadcasting is a legal
fiction, which, if you are serious about writings being tangible,
should be struck down. But that’s all it is, a legal fiction. There
was a problem, so created the legal fiction that the live work is
actually fixed when it is not.
MR. PATRY: No, no, I wouldn’t agree. I think the question
would be one of liability for somebody, not for an exercise in
Congress’ power to do it. If Congress says, “You can protect your
live broadcast of a football game, so long as you simultaneously
tape it,” I don’t see what’s wrong with that. I don’t think you need
232

Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
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to have taped it beforehand. If I am writing a chapter in a book
and I write down the first chapter, that chapter is protected. I don’t
have to write down the whole thing.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: But the infringer is not copying a
fixed work.
MR. PATRY: Right, which is why the jazz club, for me, is the
easier answer. Maybe I am begging the one that you are asking
me, which is, doesn’t that logic apply to simultaneous
transmission?
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Whatever it is, we have to move on.
Brian?
QUESTION: Brian Danitz, Fordham University.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Brian is the man who put this all
together. Congratulations, again.
[Applause]
QUESTIONER: You won’t be clapping after this question. In
terms of the limited-times on distribution, live performances are
inherently limited. I can’t get my mind around this. The
recording, the copy, is done by somebody else. It is a separate
work. That is copyrightable. You are protecting the live
performance. The distribution right is not the same as the
copyright distribution right. Why is there a limit on enjoining that
person from distributing that other work? It doesn’t seem to
trigger the limited-times provision, to me. It’s a separate thing.
The live performance is the thing being protected.
MR. PATRY: What we gave people—and on pain of people
going to jail, so it’s serious, not just theoretical—was a right to
say, “If you took my live musical performance and put it in that
form or if you are the person who is distributing it,” like Mr.
Martignon, 233 “you can’t do that.”
I wouldn’t think that what they did by fixing it is creating a
separate work. I don’t think it’s a work at all. If I am a composer,
like Irving Berlin was, who couldn’t read music and I play my

233

346 F. Supp. 2d 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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piece and somebody else writes it down for me, they are not the
author of it; I am the author of it.
So I don’t think that what Mr. Martignon did was to create
another work at all. I think that what he did was to violate a
statute.
The more serious issue, for me, is the one that Jane raises,
which is that, under one reading of this, Congress can’t do it under
either provision. That I find a more troubling prospect. You could
say, “You know, what they did back in 1994 was a bad idea, and
the guy who did it apologized for it. So please fix it.” They
wouldn’t care, but if Congress did care and they did say, “Oh,
okay, you made a mistake, and we’re going to fix it and do fifty
years,” under that reading of it, they couldn’t. That is a real issue,
because that does, then, place you in violation of your treaty
obligation.
MR. PATTON: May I just say, though, depending on your
view of simultaneous transmission and simultaneous recording, it
could be fixed, I think, either by interpreting the Copyright Act
itself to give a simultaneous recording copyright protection or by
amending the Copyright Act to, just as you have simultaneous
transmission, have a simultaneous recording.
MR. PATRY: But I thought the problem was not how the
statute was written, but the constitutional authority to do
something.
MR. PATTON: It is, but here, as it stands now, there is no
requirement that the performer record his own performance. If
Congress were to require that the performer recorded the
performance, and once he did so any simultaneous recording gave
the performer traditional copyright protection, I think that could
comply with the treaty.
MR. PATRY: But then you are redefining it as the Copyright
Act. I know Fred von Lohmann has the idea that that is what you
should do, and it would encourage people to record things. 234 But
234

See, e.g., Fred von Lohmann, Fred von Lohmann said . . ., THE PATRY COPYRIGHT
BLOG, May 18, 2005, http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2005/05/constitutionality-ofbootleg-statute.html (responding to William Patry’s essay The Constitutionality of the
Bootleg Statute).
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that is a different act; that is a different thing than what we are
talking about.
MR. PATTON: It is, but I think it’s a way to fix the treaty, if
the court were to say . . .
MR. PATRY: But that’s not the treaty. The treaty doesn’t say
you have to do it. The treaty is intended to cover what we covered,
in a constitutional way or not. That’s a separate problem, of
course, that maybe we agreed—I don’t think we did, but I think
your view, followed out, is that the administration agreed to
something Congress couldn’t constitutionally do.
MR. PATTON: Absolutely.
MR. PATRY: Then that’s the position.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: We have to move on from this, too.
I have one question. I think it’s tactically crazy to bring a
criminal case. Why wasn’t this a civil case? You put all the force
of law against this little shop owner? You just put all sorts of
equity on his side that is unnecessary.
MR. PATRY: He’s just lucky Judge Martin wasn’t on the
bench.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: This is what happens when you
overreach, maybe. It just comes back to bite you. But if this was a
civil case, I doubt that anyone would have been as concerned.
MR. PATRY: KISS Catalog is a civil case. 235
PROFESSOR HANSEN: What?
MR. PATRY: KISS Catalog, the other case in California, is a
civil case. 236
MR. PATTON: And it came out exactly the same way.
MR. PATRY: There are two criminal and one civil, and they
all came out wrong.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I stand corrected. It came out wrong,
and it might have been a copycat opinion based upon Judge Baer’s
235

Kiss Catalog, Ltd. v. Passport Intern. Prods., Inc., 135 Fed. Appx. 116 (9th Cir.
2005).
236
Id.
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case. So the criminal first case might have had some influence on
the second. What are your predictions about what is going to
happen in the Second Circuit, and beyond? Anyone?
MR. PATRY: I went to the argument. I was not encouraged. I
was not encouraged by the grasp of the issues at all. If they uphold
it, they will only uphold it out of a sort of noblesse oblige attitude
towards what they view as Congress’ fumbling, and the Court is
going to interpret it in a way that saves Congress from itself. I
found it to be a deeply disturbing argument. You probably thought
it was a good argument.
MR. PATTON: I was happy you were deeply disturbed.
I find it difficult to predict. I honestly believe we have the
better of the legal positions, certainly with the limited-times issue,
and I think also on the writings issue. But I also think it’s quite
difficult to convince a court to strike down a statute.
I think most people’s initial impression of this—I was talking
to Marjorie about this earlier—is, “This is somebody ripping off a
performer.” People have this initial sense that this is theft of some
sort. I think we have to overcome that initial impression with the
judges first.
I do think that you are probably right that the criminal context
maybe balances out the equities a bit on that issue.
I think we are in the right. What they will do I have no idea.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Anyone else with predictions?
Why is it taking so long?
MR. PATTON: They want to be careful about striking it down.
PROFESSOR GINSBURG: I don’t think it has been that long.
The Second Circuit takes—
PROFESSOR HANSEN: How many months?
MR. PATTON: Four months.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: With the Second Circuit, when I was
clerking there, there was a rule, sixty days. You have to start
writing explanations to the chief judge, why you haven’t done it,
this and this. No one likes to write those explanations.
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Usually it means there is a dissent or usually you’re worried
about something, if you are taking this long. The administrative
rules want an opinion issued before this.
We’ll see. We’ll see what that means.
MS. HEINS: Don’t the law clerks turn over in the summer?
PROFESSOR HANSEN: That’s even more of a reason why it
would come out this summer, because the law clerks turn over.
MS. HEINS: Not if it’s in July. The new clerk has to start with
it in September.
PROFESSOR GINSBURG: I am wondering about how you
would fix the statute. This obviously needs fixing. I think most of
us agree that the limited-times problem is a real problem. But
trying to figure out how you would write a statute to deal with the
subject-matter problem—if the unfixed performance isn’t a
writing, how do you either make it a writing or bring it within the
Commerce Clause in a way that is not obnoxious to the Copyright
Clause? (Although I don’t think it is obnoxious to the Copyright
Clause.)
The suggestion that maybe you could have a simultaneous
fixation for the performance is interesting, but I think, ultimately,
may be a little troublesome when you work through how it would
work. For copyright, simultaneous fixation means that now the
broadcast is a work—now and forever. But if what you are
protecting is a performance and not a work, then that means that
every time the performer performs, the performer has to create an
archive. One archive, I think we all agree, is a good thing. But if
we write a statute in a way that requires the performer, every time
she performs, no matter where, at least in the United States, to
create some kind of a backup recording—maybe that is not unduly
onerous. I don’t know. But that is, in effect, the consequence of a
simultaneous fixation requirement, because each and every single
performance is, itself, an individualized item.
Bob is correct. The performance is not a work of authorship in
the sense that once you write the song, it doesn’t matter how many
times you perform the song or if you sing the song differently
every time, the protected work is the song. But if the protected
subject matter is the singing of the song, then every time you sing,
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you have a new subject matter. So, if Congress chose to fix the
statute by providing for simultaneous fixation, that would mean
that every time you sing, you have to make your own recording, at
least simultaneous recording, of the performance if you want to
protect that same performance from being recorded and transmitted
by somebody else, if that is how you choose to fix the statute.
MR. PATTON: And I just don’t think that’s too much to ask
for federal protection.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: A question?
QUESTION: Leslie Kushner [phonetic].
Recording a performance is inherently different than recording
a broadcast. Every recording of a broadcast is identical. Every
recording of a performance is not. There is something artistic in
every recording of a performance, depending on where you put the
close-ups, what angle you take. So it seems to me that you would
have to do more than just archive each performance in order to
claim that another recording is a bootleg, because it’s not identical.
PROFESSOR GINSBURG: I think that is confusing the
copyrighted work and the performance. It is true that making a
recording itself contains elements of authorship—where you put
the microphones and so forth. So the output that results from the
performance as fixed is a work of authorship. But what we are
talking about is the performance, regardless of how fixed. That is
what makes this a slightly elusive quantity.
QUESTIONER: But what you are saying is, if it’s archived,
then that performance cannot be recorded by anybody else,
because that would be a bootleg. But that would be an inherently
different work.
PROFESSOR GINSBURG: It would be a different recording,
but it would capture the performance.
MR. CLARIDA: Right. It wouldn’t be an infringement of the
sound recording because the definition of what is protected in a
sound recording requires a mechanical copy of that sound
recording, and not an independent fixation of other sounds, which
is, I think, what you are getting at. So it wouldn’t be a pirate copy
of the authorized fixation, but it would still be . . .

PANEL_3_TRANSCRIPT_091706_CLEAN

2006]

ANTI-BOOTLEGGING LAW CASES

9/17/2006 6:06:10 PM

1281

QUESTIONER: But it wouldn’t be permitted because it’s the
same performance.
PROFESSOR GINSBURG: That’s correct. That’s right,
because what the performer is trying to do is to prevent other
people from either making concrete (from fixing) or from
transmitting her rendition as she is singing it. It is the difference
between a bootleg and a pirated copy. If she has made a recording,
copying that recording is record piracy. That is making a copy of
the copy. But somebody else making a copy of her performance—
whether or not their recording of it has artistic elements doesn’t
matter. What she is trying to do is protect her performance.
Does anybody remember the movie Diva? 237 The plot turned
on an opera singer who didn’t ever want to be recorded.
The interests that a statute like this protects are not only the
commercial interests, but for some artists, they may well be
integrity interests, so-called moral rights—that the artist doesn’t
ever want to be recorded or wants only to be recorded under
conditions that she has supervised, agreed to, and all of that.
Somebody said, is this an incentive to anything? Yes, it is.
One can say that a statute like this is an incentive and is consistent
with the policies underlying the Copyright Act, to the extent that
one discerns author policies underlying the Copyright Act, in that
it does give the performer some control over what creative thing is
done with her performance. Ideally, the Copyright Act should
establish a legal environment conducive to creativity (and
performance); a law which gives authors and performers some
control over the exploitation of their work may be more likely to
stimulate artistic activity than a law which makes it open season on
works of authorship and performance.
MS. HEINS: But there is another policy side to it, which is that
she has chosen to give a public performance.
MR. CLARIDA: Maybe not. It doesn’t have to be a public
performance.
MS. HEINS: Right, and I think the balance might be struck
very differently if somebody were not giving a public performance
237
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to which they were selling tickets which anybody could buy. It
seems, at that point, you are in public, and there is a public interest
in being able to record it. You have not retained any privacy
interest.
PROFESSOR GINSBURG: I don’t think there is a right to
make a public record of every event which people pay to attend.
MS. HEINS: If you are in public, there is at least an argument
that you are relinquishing some right of privacy. If you have a
rehearsal, which is a limited invitation only, I think it’s quite a
different story.
PROFESSOR GINSBURG: So all those Lincoln Centers and
all those sporting arenas and all those other people who say, “You
can’t bring cameras in here. You can’t record the live performance
or the live sports event” . . .
MR. PATTON: But that is state law.
MR. CLARIDA: It should be preempted, then.
PROFESSOR GINSBURG: But the argument Marjorie is
making is a First Amendment-type argument. It wouldn’t matter
whether the basis of the prohibition is state law or federal law.
You are positing a public interest, a sort of right to have a publicly
available historical record of any performance that takes place in a
public place, even if access to the performance is limited to those
who pay and so forth.
MS. HEINS: I think I would make a little less ambitious claim
than that. I would say, in the context of balancing the artist’s
interest in not having a public performance recorded against the
public’s and history’s interest in having a record of it, there are
some arguments on the other side.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: The Court has sort of rejected those
public-interest, First Amendment arguments. Certainly, in the
Random House-Ford autobiography case it did. 238 The Court said,
“No, the First Amendment does not provide additional public
interest defense to fair use.” 239 In any case, Justice O’Connor said
that the First Amendment is on the author’s side, because he may
238
239

Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
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not have wanted to speak at that time. Thus, the First Amendment
supports the role of copyright rather than serves to undercut
copyright protection. 240
MS. HEINS: When they take it on the road, I think there is a
different balance. Even with an unpublished work, there is still
some fair use left for unpublished works. Congress made that
explicit after the Salinger case. 241 It is not a bad analysis. With an
unpublished work, the author may or may not have made a
conscious decision not to reveal this to the world. But there are
some interests on the other side.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: If you equate a First Amendment
right with whatever might be in the public interest, you make the
First Amendment much broader than the Court has ever gone. Nor
do I think that the Court is currently inclined to go that way. I
think that’s probably why these arguments have lost dramatically
in every court they have been raised in, including the D.C. case. 242
MS. HEINS: Not every fair-use claim to take quotations from
an unpublished work has lost.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: No, no, not every . . .
PROFESSOR GINSBURG: You are positing the entire work,
the entire performance. That’s a harder sell.
MS. HEINS: I am simply saying that there is no absolute
author privacy interest here.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: All right, I think we have actually
ventilated this issue quite a bit, let’s go to the audience.
I saw a hand over here. Name and affiliation, please.
QUESTION: I am Tina Ravitz. I am the former chief counsel
at Newsweek, where we didn’t have bootleg issues, so forgive the
naïveté of this question.
If we assume that a live performance can be theatrical, where
you would have the author of the play or the musical, the person

240
241
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See, e.g., Authors League v. Oman, 790 F.2d, 220, 223 (2d Cir. 1986).
Salinger v. Random House, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987).
Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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who wrote the lyrics, the person who was the composer, and you
have thirty performers, who has standing under the statute?
MR. PATRY: It doesn’t cover that type of work. It’s only a
live musical performance. That’s a dramatic work.
QUESTIONER: Only a musical performance, okay. Thank
you.
PROFESSOR GINSBURG: If it were a live improvisation of a
theatrical work—Second City 243 —and there were not some
preexisting scenario or something that would more or less
constitute the work that is being performed, then you do have a
problem. It doesn’t mean you don’t have a claim, but you don’t
have a claim under federal copyright law. Your claim would be
under what is left of state common-law copyright, just like those
old cases that were referred to about the people who went into
theaters, memorized the plays, and then had them produced down
the block. That was all common-law copyright.
So the absence of federal protection doesn’t mean that the work
is absolutely fair game. It’s just that a different source of law
would apply.
QUESTION: My name is Chuck Leininger. I am also a thirdyear at Pepperdine.
Mr. Patry, as the author of the statute, how would like to
maybe fix the statute or do things differently to avoid this whole
mess?
MR. PATRY: “Author” has never sounded so like such a
negative term.
The only way I would fix it is by limiting it to fifty years. I
would probably also have—because I have become more of a
public-interest guy—some exemptions that take care of what Judge
Leval would call transformative uses. I would need to think those
out more, but I think you do need things that would take into
account people who use portions of bootlegs in the creation of
other works—sort of like a fair-use type of thing.
Those are the two things that I would do.
243

A Chicago-based improvisational comedy group.

PANEL_3_TRANSCRIPT_091706_CLEAN

2006]

ANTI-BOOTLEGGING LAW CASES

9/17/2006 6:06:10 PM

1285

PROFESSOR HANSEN: Anyone else?
[No response]
Any final comments?
MS. HEINS: I could just pick up on that, because I didn’t get
to it during my talk. The law professors’ brief said one of the
reasons that the statute is overbroad is that there is no provision for
fair use. Evidently, the government responded, “Well, that’s not
necessarily so. There could be fair use read into it,” at which point
the law professors turned around and said, “Well, that just
underlines our point that it’s vague, because we don’t know
whether there is a fair-use defense for this.”
MR. PATRY: Right. I would say that there isn’t, unless one
wants to read it in as a Commerce Clause good government
provision. But since I don’t think there is any overbreadth
problems, it doesn’t bother me from a legal standpoint, although it
does bother me from a policy standpoint. That’s why I say, from a
policy standpoint, if one were to fix it, I would certainly do that.
PROFESSOR GINSBURG: You could make a textual
argument, based on the language you cited earlier, that somebody
who violates the statute shall be subject to the remedies provided
in §§ 502–505, 244 to the same extent as any infringer of copyright.
One could argue that what makes you an infringer of copyright is
that you have made an unauthorized reproduction and so forth that
is not excused by §§ 107 and so forth. 245
MR. PATRY: Right.
PROFESSOR GINSBURG: So you could sort of funnel all of
the Copyright Act in there.
MR. CLARIDA: The criminal provision wouldn’t have that
advantage, though, because it says you go to jail or you pay a fine.
It doesn’t have the “to the same extent as an infringer.”
MR. PATRY: Most people who will be charged under the
criminal provision are not making what most people would

244
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17 U.S.C. §§ 502–505 (2000).
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
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consider to be a fair use, along the transformative lines I am
talking about.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Okay. Our speakers have been
excellent, and the audience participation has been interested,
insightful and caused the issues to be examined on even a higher
level. Thank you all very much.

